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2	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
3	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
4	Case No. 08-13555 (JMP)
5	Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) (SIPA)
6	Adv. Case No. 09-01728
7	x
8	In the Matter of:
9	LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC., et al.,
10	Debtors.
11	x
12	In the Matter of:
13	LEHMAN BROTHERS INC.,
14	Debtor.
15	x
16	MICHIGAN STATE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
17	AUTHORITY,
18	Plaintiff,
19	-against-
2 0	LB DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS INC., et al.,
21	Defendants.
22	x
23	
2 4	(cont'd. on next page)
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1	U.S. Bankruptcy Court	
2	One Bowling Green	
3	New York, New York	
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5	September 22, 2010	
6	10:02 AM	
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8	B E F O R E:	
9	HON. JAMES M. PECK	
10	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE	
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Page 3 1 STATUS CONFERENCE 2 3 HEARING re Motion for Authorization to Reject Certain Executory Contracts [Docket No. 11201] 5 6 7 HEARING re Motion of Taipei Fubon Commercial Bank Co., Ltd. Seeking Authority to Assign its Interests as Lender in a 9 Promissory Note Issued by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. [Docket 10 No. 110511 11 HEARING re Debtors' Motion for Approval of (I) A Settlement 12 13 Agreement between the Debtors and Aurora Bank FSB Regarding the Master Forward Agreement and Other Matters and (II) Certain 14 Other Related Relief, Including Authorization of (A) Certain 15 16 Debtors to Make Capital Transfers, (B) LBHI to Enter into a Capital Maintenance Agreement, and (C) LBHI to Extend the 17 Duration of the Amended Repurchase Agreement and Financing 18 19 Facility [Docket No. 11141] 20 HEARING re Debtors' Motion for Approval of (I) a Settlement 21 Agreement between the Debtors and Woodlands Commercial Bank and 22 (II) Certain Related Relief, including Authorization of (A) 23 24 Certain Debtors to Make Capital Transfers and (B) LBHI to Enter 25 Into a Capital Maintenance Agreement [Docket No. 11142]

Page 4 1 2 HEARING re Motion of Lehman Commercial Paper Inc. for Approval 3 of that Certain Amended and Restated Compromise by and Among 4 Lehman Commercial Paper Inc., Alfred H. Siegel, as Chapter 11 5 Trustee for the SunCal Debtors, and the Official Committee of 6 Unsecured Creditors in the SunCal Bankruptcy Cases [Docket No. 11153] 7 HEARING re Motion of the Chapter 11 Trustee of the SunCal 9 Master Debtors for Relief from the Automatic Stay [Docket No. 10 11 9642] 12 13 HEARING re Michigan State Housing Development Authority v. LB 14 Derivative Products Inc., et al. [Adv. Case No. 09-01728] 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Transcribed By: Clara Rubin and Sharona Shapiro 25

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Page 21 PROCEEDINGS 1 2 THE COURT: Be seated, please. Good morning, Mr. Miller. 3 MR. MILLER: Good morning, Your Honor. There's --4 THE COURT: Before you start, let me just make an 5 6 announcement for those people who are standing in the aisles. 7 We really do have adequate overflow capacity upstairs, and I don't think if you're going to be sitting there you're going to 9 miss anything. You'll certainly be able to hear and see what's on video. If you were actually planning to participate in the 10 11 substance of the hearing later, I'm going to take maybe a five-minute break after the State of the Estate report to allow 12 13 people to reassemble. So anybody's who's on the seventh floor 14 who needs to participate or wants to observe in person the 15 later proceedings will have an opportunity to come back. I'm 16 just, frankly, concerned about the comfort of the crowd and 17 encourage you to move, but I'm not going to force you to move. 18 It'd be great if somebody actually follows that suggestion. 19 Thank you, the one person who left. 20 MR. MILLER: There is a rumor, Your Honor, this is being streamed into Times Square. 21 22 THE COURT: That's a completely false rumor, as far as I know. 23 24 MR. MILLER: Good morning, Your Honor. Harvey Miller, 25 Weil, Gotshal & Manges, on behalf of the debtors.

Your Honor, we have on the agenda for this morning as the first matter a status conference, which has been entitled "State of the Estate Presentation". And before we get to it, Your Honor, I'd like to make a few introductory remarks.

It has been a little over two years since the commencement of these huge totally unplanned Chapter 11 cases that have affected the lives of so many persons and threatened the viability of the financial system, the global financial system, cases that have spawned over eighty foreign insolvency proceedings and have accentuated the need for a global system to deal with interconnected insolvency cases. The primary case, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., started with little appreciation of how the assets of the Lehman enterprise and its broker-dealer subsidiary Lehman Brothers Inc. would be salvaged and values preserved.

The Court aptly described Lehman as having been overcome by a tsunami of the most gigantic proportions.

Whatever else may be stated, I believe it is beyond dispute that Lehman was the spark that ignited the financial collapse that almost brought down Morgan Stanley & Co. and even the mighty Goldman Sachs, and did cause the AIG bailout and the merger of Washington Mutual Savings into Wachovia. It was a major precipitating factor in the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act of 2010.

Lehman has made the phrase "too big to fail" a part of

the lexicon -- everyday lexicon of the United States Congress, the Internet and the media. The debate over the demise of the Lehman enterprise was the result of egregious miscalculation on the part of the Federal Reserve Bank, the United States Treasury and others. That debate continues unabated.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was appointed during 2009 to undertake an investigation into the causes of the financial crisis of 2008. That commission's report is scheduled to be filed in December of this year. In testimony before that commission two or three weeks ago, Chairman Bernanke testified that the Federal Reserve Bank seriously miscalculated the consequences of Lehman's collapse. He also defended the decision to strictly construe Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act as having presented an absolute bar to any federal assistance to soften the effects of Lehman's bankruptcy on the world financial system.

By my count, there are at least twenty-five books that have been published since January 2009, setting forth the alleged facts and hypotheses as to the circumstances and reasons why Lehman collapsed in the manner in which it did.

Much has been written, particularly by the participants in the decision-making process in the fall of 2008; constitutes revisionist history. It reminds one of the debate Winston Churchill was having with an adversary in the House of Commons, in response to criticisms of actions he was taking as prime

minister of the United Kingdom. Churchill loudly explained 'History will prove I am right. I know that, for I will write the history.' So much for former Secretary Paulson's book "On the Brink".

There have been at least three extensive TV documentaries centered on the financial collapse of the Lehman enterprise. On October 1st of this year, the New York Film Festival will present a documentary entitled "Inside Job" which covers the planting of the seeds of the financial disaster, the insatiable greed that led to more and more risk-taking and the eventual bursting of the bubble. A good portion of the film deals with Lehman's contribution to a market built on excessive debt, short-term credit and deregulation that betrayed public trust.

In that context, the past two years have been crammed with intensive dedication on the part of many, many persons to retrieve, preserve and enhance the value of the Lehman enterprise so that a fair Chapter 11 plan may be proposed that will equitably distribute the asset values that had been created by the dedication of the persons who have been administering these cases.

The docket sets forth the numerous proceedings that have been brought in this court, proceedings that have taken hours and hours of dedicated time of persons involved, and of the Court. Yet those proceedings are but the tip of the

iceberg and do not adequately describe the day-to-day activities that go on at the Lehman offices and in the offices of the professionals engaged by Lehman and others in the search for assets values and protection of the debtors' interest and, therefore, creditor interests.

These are the most complex and difficult cases to ever enter the bankruptcy stream. They are spiced with esoteric financial transactions and securities, global considerations, intercreditor disputes and issues, conflicts of laws, and almost every problem that one might conceive. Nonetheless, significant progress has been made, albeit at substantial cost of administration, which the media is so happy to point out and elaborate.

I take comfort in the words of Professor Douglas Baird who responded to media inquiries as to fees by essentially asking that there be a realistic analysis of the aggregate fees in the context of the value of the assets administered and ultimately the success of the administration.

Two years is a relatively short period of time in the perspective of the cases of the magnitude and complexity of these cases. The provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, when adopted, did not contemplate such cases. It has been almost unanimously agreed that the eighteen-month limitation on the proposal of a Chapter 11 plan doesn't really fit these cases. And the same might very well apply to the statute of

limitations for avoidance actions that are set forth in Section 546 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Indeed it took the examiner over fourteen months to complete and file his report in March of this year, at a cost of almost 105 million dollars. As I am sure the Court has noted, September 15, 2010, just seven days ago, a large -- I'm sorry, just seven days ago, a large number of adversary proceedings, based upon the avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code, were initiated in this court. In addition, the debtors-in-possession have entered into a large number of agreements with potential adversaries to toll the otherwise applicable statutes of limitations for the commencement of recovery actions.

Undoubtedly there will be significant litigation augmenting the substantial litigation that has already been commenced and is pending before the Court. However, the objective is that economic compromise should be the basic guideline to the resolution of issues and the formulation of an amended Chapter 11 plan that will fairly deal with the claims of all constituencies and avoid the excessive costs of litigation and the time that may be consumed by such litigation.

As has been the practice for the past two years, and in response to the Court's request, the debtors' administrators, led by Mr. Bryan Marsal and Mr. John Suckow,

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Page 27 will present today what has been characterized as "The State of 1 2 the Estate". (It's interesting that it's on the same day that President Obama is doing something of that character.) It is a continuation of prior similar reports that were made to the 4 5 Court over the past two years. 6 Unless the Court has questions, I would propose to 7 turn the lectern over to Mr. Marsal to commence the report. THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Miller. Mr. Marsal, the floor is yours. 9 MR. MARSAL: Good morning, Your Honor. 10 11 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Marsal. MR. MARSAL: Your Honor, I just want to make sure the 12 audience and you understand that, beginning with the 13 commencement of this presentation, the company is 14 15 simultaneously filing a Form 8-K with the SEC and is also 16 making this entire presentation available on its Web site. So as of right now, everything that's going to be shown is 17 available to the public. 18 19 THE COURT: But no streaming video of you? 20 MR. MARSAL: No. No, sir. No streaming video, I 21 hope. I hope. 22 What we'd like to cover with you today, Your Honor, is really a summary of what we've been doing the last two years, 23 24 covering the assets -- the asset recovery efforts, the claims 25 resolution efforts and, finally, the plan of reorganization,

which I believe I promised you about a week ago. So we will see where we are in that entire process.

Going to the executive summary, this case, as Mr.

Miller points out, is a highly complex case which I think has
advanced significantly over the last -- since the last State of
the Estate. The market for the various assets of the
company -- liquidity has improved, refinancings has improved,
and we've been employing, along with the improvement in the
market, an aggressive asset recovery strategy, reinvesting in
assets, completing assets that were either work-in-process or
identifying control positions, trying to obtain those positions
we think has proven to be a very effective strategy in
maximizing the recovery value.

By the final bar date in November, we received 1.2 trillion dollars of claims filed. Significant progress has been made, as you'll see later in the presentation, on that 1.2 trillion. Today at the holdings level, we are down to in the neighborhood of 260 to 360 million dollars' worth of -- billion, excuse me, worth of claims. That's still a large number, and much work to be done, but you'll see, I think, that significant progress has been made.

We filed the plan, a directional plan, on the -- in

March, followed by a disclosure statement in April. And we

believe that creditor differences have been significantly

narrowed over the course of time since that -- since coming out

with that original plan.

Moving on to specifics, every asset team -- and, again, if you recall, we divide the estate into five assets teams; each of those assets have updated their recovery analysis from the April presentation, the April disclosure statement. Every one of those teams is coming in with higher recovery values. The markets continue to stabilize, and values in pricing is improving. Again, we would emphasize that our liquidation strategy, which has been supported, most importantly, by the unsecured creditors' committee, is focused on the creation of value as opposed to the creation of immediate cash, which is -- which I think will pay significant dividends to the estate.

We've worked out a deal with the FDIC, which we believe will optimize the liquidation recovery from the bank platforms. Where appropriate, and I'm sorry about this one because I know you've got a lot on your docket, but we have --we're pursuing significant lawsuits against some of the clearing banks, against Barclays, and clearly there is a slew of potential avoidance actions out there that we filed with the Court or received tolling agreements on.

On the foreign administrative front, I'm happy to report that that relationship has improved over the course of two years. We're really working together now. I wish it had been earlier, but it's working well now. And I think that

you're going to see, as you'll see later in our presentation, improvement in recovery values because of that.

We have a good relationship with LBI, but I'm still very much in the dark. I'm very much in the dark what's going on at LBI, and I wish -- you know, I wish Mr. Miller had added that to the things that need to be addressed about the bankruptcy process, because --

THE COURT: Could you explain what you mean by --

MR. MARSAL: I --

THE COURT: -- by that?

MR. MARSAL: I just don't feel I know what's going on in that estate, Your Honor. I don't understand how some of the assets are being treated. And we continue to feel -- we just continue to feel a bit in the dark, and I don't know what I can do about it, but --

THE COURT: Well, only within the last month, I believe, the LBI trustee filed a fairly extensive written report, which I've had a chance to look at. I'm sure you've seen the report as well. I'm frankly surprised at that comment, both given the content of that report and given the parallel fiduciary duties of the two estate administrators. But we can talk some more about that another time.

MR. MARSAL: Yeah, I will -- yeah, it's not a complaint. We have a good relationship, Your Honor, but there's just lots of information lacking from our team -- from

various teams' perspective on --

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THE COURT: Is that because the information is not available or because the information is not being shared?

MR. MARSAL: I don't know which. There is cooperation, Your Honor. I don't know whether it's available, but there is cooperation, but we just have -- after two years, I wouldn't have expected to have some of the holes that we have in our fact base --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MARSAL: -- that we have today. But, again, I think -- I don't want to harp on it, because I'm eighty percent happy and twenty percent unhappy, if you would.

Last but not least, on the JPMorgan front, very helpful in getting that out of the way. We have -- that has cleared up some of the -- cleared up our ability to dispose of some of the assets as to the removal of the liens. So that, again, is helping the overall administration of the case.

Next item on the exec summary is claims management.

Originally 860 billion in claims were filed at LBHI, and 302

billion at the various subsidiaries. After cleaning up errors and dupes, we believe that the unsecured claims at LBHI are closer to 250 to 350 billion. Our target right now -- we believe that the number will ultimately come out closer to 250 to 260 billion in claims, but we still have that kind of a range to work on, which is with the additional analysis that's

needed. We also are in a position -- because of getting the claims more in order, we think we now are in a position to really have a plan where we know who could vote on a plan as to who has a legitimate claim, if you would.

The key priority of the last six months has been to focus on the foreign receivers. And, again, I think we've made significant progress on that front.

In terms of case administration, Your Honor knows the examiner's report was filed in March. We have a slew of requests from various governmental agencies that -- prior to this report and post this report, asking for information and continue to support that effort. Full transparency in communication with the UCC, U.S. Trustee, fee committee, that's just ongoing. Financial reporting is timely and current. Given the size and complexity of the cases involved, again, I would consider this overall administration to be timely and efficient.

In terms of the plan process, the original timetable, as I said, was to try and complete -- to get a plan of reorganization approved by the second anniversary. The biggest obstacle to doing that is the foreign receivers. We miscalculated as to how long it was going to take us to first of all educate them on the Chapter 11 process and our issues, then have them go back to their various constituencies and explain to them the issues, explain to their creditors the

issues, and then to come back to us with a counterproposal. That process has been somewhat time-consuming and slow and, particularly if you happen to be domestic creditor, you're a little frustrated by this. We've urged everyone to be patient because it's a lot better than the alternative, which we think is a litigation, which will get us nowhere and at least will delay the process even further.

THE COURT: I don't want to interrupt your flow --

MR. MARSAL: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: -- but can you tell me how the multilateral protocol is functioning and whether or not that's a meaningful contributor to improved relations?

MR. MARSAL: It is, Your Honor, in that -- I mean, no one is -- obviously, no one is going to jeopardize their sovereign rights to apply whatever principles they have in their country. But even LBIE, despite not being a direct participant in the protocol, is in fact operating as if it were a participant in the protocol. So I think it's been very effective in terms of communication.

The first six months were rough. The next six months got better. The last twelve months it's been pretty good; lots of cooperation among the receivers. And, in fact, later on today we're going to announce that we reached our first settlement with the largest -- with one of the largest receivers, and we would hope to have that be the first of a

number of settlements which will be before the Court. And, again, I don't want to jump ahead, but we'll talk about that later. That's been the biggest handicap was the foreign receivers.

We are anticipating that we're going to file a new disclosure statement by the -- sometime in the fourth quarter of this year, and we will be seeking a plan to be approved, hopefully plan confirmation, in the first quarter of 2011.

Again, that's aggressive, and I've been cautioned by Mr. Miller not to say that, but trying to drive an organization toward a realistic date, and I think it's realistic subject to, obviously, some of the other parties going along with it, but I think there is momentum in the case to get the case resolved, at least as a -- resolved as it relates to the claims.

Moving on to the specific assets, our cash position as of the end of June -- well, this is significantly higher today, but, again, to try and -- we have a June 30th cutoff date. If you look over to your right, Your Honor, you'll see 18 billion in cash -- 18.9 billion in cash, with 2.2 billion in posted pre-petition cash collateral; that's principally at Citibank.

THE COURT: If you were to update that to today's number or something around today's number, what would you be talking about in terms of an order of magnitude of cash on hand?

MR. MARSAL: I would --

Page 35 MR. MILLER: Another billion to billion and a half, 1 Your Honor. 2 3 MR. MARSAL: Another billion to billion and a half, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: So we're talking maybe twenty-two and a 5 6 half to twenty-three billion? 7 MR. MARSAL: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. MR. MARSAL: Yes. In terms of -- the next slide, this 9 is -- I wanted to identify what the sources of that cash flow 10 11 The total sources of cash, 25.9 billion dollars, coming -- the biggest single source is derivatives. 12 13 been uses of cash, operating expenses, 1.6 billion; again, that would represent about eighteen months' worth of expenses, to 14 15 give you a run rate of how we are spending money today. And 16 the -- you see the Bankhaus settlement of 1.28 billion dollars. So in total our uses of cash are 7.9 billion, resulting in the 17 18 billion dollars on the previous page. 18 Okay. 19 20 In terms of the first category of key assets, loans, we had a large portfolio. We were simply a commercial lender. 21 22 The market continues to improve in this area. Refinancings are happening actually ahead of schedule. While we're not seeing 23 24 more dollars, we're seeing an acceleration of the repayments, 25 which is the good news. So from a

present-value standpoint, this is improving.

Unfunded revolvers: We have eliminated twenty-six billion of unfunded revolvers at a minimal cost to the estate. That's about eighty-five percent completed, and I would expect that this will be -- at a timely filed plan, this will be a nonissue, any unfunded responsibility or problem.

Our strategy in loans has been to continue to rely on an improving liquidity position. Again, with the support of the unsecured committee, we've been pretty successful in creating value there as opposed to blowing out positions today.

Next.

On the derivative front, we are increasing the estimate of gross recovery proceeds by 850 million dollars. And I'm cautiously optimistic that the next time we report on this, this will in fact be better than the 850 million we're talking about here. But all the -- we expect to collect fifteen billion from derivates from all the various receivables being managed or being supervised by LAMCO. LAMCO is actively hedging some of the positions in order to lock up the contract values. I mean hedging the positions not to -- not for purposes of making money; just to make sure that we have those values locked up.

Big bank -- the big issue with derivatives is resolution of the big-bank claims. That remains a major challenge in 2011. It shouldn't get in the way of a plan, but

it will take some time. As I think I've said in the past, Your Honor, this is a situation where very aggressive files (sic) have been claimed and lots of homework has to be done to support those claims.

The last shot there. The derivative team has done a terrific job. They've surpassed all of our expectations and have outperformed internal targets.

On the private equity front, again, much of this private equity was created -- what Lehman would do is Lehman would -- as they raised a fund for a private-equity firm, they would always take a piece of the fund as an LP. And so what we're left with is many, many of these limited partnership interests in various funds. The guy putting the deal together would get the bonus and we would be stuck with the long-term play of this private equity investment, unfortunately. That's going to take a long time to wind down.

Having said that, though, market conditions are better. The disposition and pricing on those assets are improving. The portfolio's up about two percent since April.

And the team really has a pretty good understanding of the exit strategy. And, again, I'm pretty pleased with what's going on from that team.

THE COURT: Just a question on that.

MR. MARSAL: Yes.

THE COURT: Is the thought to endeavor to monetize

those positions, or simply to hold onto them and hope for the best?

MR. MARSAL: Well, it varies, Your Honor. In some instances, the -- it depends on the age of the fund. If the fund has an exit with an eight-year strategy, we would probably hang onto it if we're in the eighth -- seventh year, let's say. If we're -- if it has an eight-year disposition strategy and we're in the second year, we would be more prone to sell as opposed to hold. It depends on each -- it depends on the circumstances associated with each investment.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MARSAL: In terms of real estate, the real-estate gross proceeds have actually improved, in terms of our analysis, a hundred million dollars, but significantly more than that in terms of repayments are being accelerated in terms of timing. And in the original proposal we made some mistakes on the calculation of recovery value. So this masks some of the correction of the mistakes that were made. So it's more like about a half a billion dollars' worth of real-estate improvement during this time period.

We are not calculating this go-round the unrecognized upside in value. We're taking a more conservative posture on that. And I believe that the LAMCO real-estate team has finally moved from being originators of loans to loan workout professionals, now to working the asset management

professionals. So there's been a -- you know, it's been a good evolution.

You know, the -- again, I can't overstress, the cooperation of the UCC has been vital in this process, because we've done some unorthodox things on the real-estate front in terms of reinvesting and trying to get control of a position so that we can protect positions or to be able to take action.

And that's been very much appreciated.

On the bank platforms, which has, I know, been a real thorn in the Court's side, us coming back continually on this, finally got a deal with the FDIC. We think we're going to realize at least a billion-and-a-half-plus over the next eighteen months out of this. It also eliminates -- as Your Honor will remember, there's a substantial priority claim by the FDIC claimed if this thing were to go into liquidation, and that becomes a nonissue.

On the foreign receivables side, there's an increase of one billion dollars in gross recoveries that should be anticipated. And a combination of just not having the facts --we're getting -- again, as we get more cooperation, we understand the asset side of the subsidiaries and how they're doing better, of the receivers, not under -- I mean of the foreign receivers, I should say.

item on the avoidance actions and tolling agreements, those total -- they have a notional value of five billion dollars that we are pursuing, in addition to the three major cases of Bank of America, Barclays, JPMorgan. This is not all the major cases. There are other potential major cases which are being tolled.

In terms of what does that all mean to us, what it means is that on the disclosure statement in April, we outlined net proceeds of 55.3 billion. Today the estate would say that's it's more like 2.2 billion. And, again, that 55.3 was probably overstated at that time, so the improvement is closer to 3 billion dollars during the six-month period. And -- but we're now looking at net proceeds of 57.5 billion; this is after reinvestment, by the way, Your Honor -- second to last line -- of 1.8 billion.

In terms of the legal -- the same 57.5 billion by a legal entity, which would be undoubtedly of interest to the various claimants, you see the 57.5 broken out by various legal entity. Most of the reinvestment will be reinvestment in LBHI assets.

Okay, the next slide covers headcount plan, how will this -- how has this matter been executed. What you've got, Your Honor, are three categories of activities: LAMCO, which is really asset management; administration, which includes your claims and your financials; and then litigation, which is all

the various actions we've got going on, along with forensic activities.

We attempted to cross the horizontal axis to identify three points in time, April '09, April '10 and April -- a projected April '11, to give you an idea of how the estate will be moving in terms of headcount. I don't -- you know, I mean, the -- you've got -- what you see in the change between April '09 and April '10 really reflects, again, the activity on the claims side increasing, and the assets side decreasing, as it relates to A&M, for example.

You see the derivative portfolio. Much of LAMCO will be coming down as derivatives wind down. It's our objective,

Your Honor, that the 149 A&M employees that were on board April

10th -- excuse me, April of 2010, will be down to 66 by the anniversary of that date, namely April 2011.

THE COURT: Does that assume confirmation of a plan in the first quarter, or that's just a projected date that's unrelated to that contingency?

MR. MARSAL: It's a projected date, Your Honor. I didn't get quite so -- I got the dates from the operating people, and maybe it hasn't been exactly coordinated, but that's a directional. I mean, I would take it as directional. There's one other problem you have here, and that is, as the market improves, the people in legacy Lehman -- we run a risk that those people are going to be leaving. And, I mean, we see

more and more people leaving the estate, and there is only one failsafe and that's A&M filling the hole. So this assumes that we can keep the people and we can identify some business in LAMCO, for example, and hopefully give a -- you know, give them the interest to both retention and give them a career path.

And if we can't do that, this projection could be in jeopardy.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MARSAL: Claims resolution side, as I indicated, was filed, was 1.162 trillion dollars of claims, consisting of LBHI of 860 billion and 302 of the -- that are subsidiaries. The first cutout at adjusted claims -- when we got the first cutout, which was by April, we said 'Wait a minute, this is way overstated.' So the total claims, LBHI, was 605 and we felt that the claims at the subsidiary level were about 135. At that point in time, when we came out with the disclosure statement, we came out with a third column, which is your likely allowed claims; that reflects the numbers in the disclosure statement of 395 billion, of which 260 would be at LBHI.

The fourth column is -- after scrubbing it further, we believe that the 740 billion of claims is now 464 billion. We believe that LBHI, 605, is now down to 363. And we believe that the -- that subsidiary claims are, from 135, down to 101.

The last column is where we think this is all going to end up, and that is we think that at the end of the day we're

Page 43 looking at something close to an LBHI claim of 264 and total 1 claims in the subsidiaries of 101 million, for a total of 2 365 -- I'm sorry -- million -- billion. I keep saying "million" when I mean "billion". 365 billion. Any questions 4 on that, Your Honor? 5 6 THE COURT: I'm not going to ask you --7 MR. MARSAL: Confusing? THE COURT: -- how you make that projection, because 8 9 I'm assuming you have some kind of proprietary information. MR. MARSAL: Yes, Your Honor. That would be -- it 10 11 would be inappropriate in this forum to discuss that, but yes we do. Each of these have a -- we have a negotiation going on 12 13 is what I'm trying to say. THE COURT: Fine. I accept this as your best estimate 14 15 of where --16 MR. MARSAL: Yes. THE COURT: -- this is going to end up. 17 MR. MARSAL: Best estimate. 18 19 Summary highlights. Although not adjudicated at this 20 point, substantial progress. We've brought it from 1.2 trillion down to 464 billion. The affiliate guaranty 21 outstanding claims are projected to decrease by 150 billion. 22 We think we have -- we're pretty close to getting agreement on 23 24 that from the various foreign subsidiary -- foreign 25 The same thing is true of third-party guaranty administrators.

claims. The estimate of direct claims -- we've actually increased a reserve of ten billion dollars; that's -- that is -- that again is a contingent reserve. As we get into the negotiations with various parties, we believe some portion of that ten billion will be needed, which is incorporated in our estimate.

And then the intercompany claims. We feel pretty comfortable with the intercompany claims, with one exception, and that is LBT, where we have an active negotiation going on. But, again, this is a work in process and -- but forty-three billion is -- we think, continues to be a reasonable estimate.

In terms of the plan, the plan -- I think the key parts of this is that there's a lot of cooks in this kitchen.

Can we go to that? Thank you.

There's a lot of cooks in the kitchen. In addition to the UCC and the LBHI ad hocs and the LBSF ad hocs and the LBT ad hocs and a number of foreign protocol administrators and foreign administrators, LBIE and LBI, and various other inputs, we have a lot of cooks in the kitchen who were commenting about the structure and the construct of the plan. And we welcome all the input and -- but clearly this just speaks to the size of this case.

In terms of the key issues presented by the parties, substantive consolidation versus nonsubstantive consolidation, and we've done our review, we have -- you know, we see merit in

both arguments. The company, on the substantive consolidation side, was operated as one company. It was -- again, it was managed -- it really was not managed on a legal-entity basis.

Many of the subsidiaries had absolutely no employees, they had no addresses, they had no physical locations. This was simply an accounting entry. Again, the -- at the same time, having said that, there were separate subsidiary financial statements, and in fact the company had thirty comptrollers going into vigorous detail on constructing these financial statements; we think, mostly for tax purposes, but they went into extensive detail on keeping the books and records separate. A vote in favor of sub con.

There was a centralized cash management system and, really, reliance -- there's no apparent -- as far as we can see, there's no good argument made for a separate credit analysis. There was one entity that we saw from a financial credit analysis standpoint that people were looking to.

At the same time, we've interviewed subsidiary creditors who assert that a double-dip claim's appropriate because two's better than one, irrespective of the reliance factor. They did rely on it, because it's better to get a subsidiary guaranty than not to get a subsidiary guaranty, even if they didn't have financials.

On the regulatory standpoint, it's pointed out by each side that Lehman was subject to the CSE program, which means

global supervision of both the holding company and of LBI by the SEC. And yet clearly -- you know, clearly, Lehman entities were regulated by local law and by separate rules. So there's pros and cons on both sides, and what we tried to do, we listened to everyone.

Yes?

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, if I may interject. Insofar as this presentation is concerned, this is intended just for informational purposes. These are not intended to be binding admissions against interests or anything of that kind, but just for informational purposes in respect of this report.

MR. MARSAL: Thank you.

THE COURT: That cautionary note is understood and is in the record, and I never assumed that this hot issue, which is being highlighted at a very high level, is being resolved in any manner or that there's any bias being shown in the chart, either in favor of or in opposition to substantive consolidation. I simply take this as a listing of some of the consideration's pro and con.

MR. MILLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. MARSAL: Thank you.

And going to the next -- having said the pros and cons, what we said was we think the best way to go here is an economic compromise plan which respects the individual subsidiaries and their legal status, and yet there are

compromises that would be made to LBHI which would, again, provide a basis for their waiving any claim to a substantive-consolidation argument. We think that this economic compromise, as pointed out below, will reduce the time and costs and need to litigate a very, very thorny issue given --many, many thorny issues on this topic, and really to try and avoid the issue of having to deal with whether or not sub con or not applies here. That is our objective is to come out with an economic compromise which will make nobody happy but everybody happy.

In terms of our priorities in the plan process, the first group that we needed to attack was the international affiliates. And like I said, Your Honor, we made significant progress on that as of yesterday. We have an agreement in principle with the German receiver, Bankhaus, which is an important one -- it's the second largest of the receivers -- on a settlement. And that settlement, though, is subject to us going to -- is them going back to their creditors -- the receiver going back to their creditors and us going back to the unsecured creditors' committee as well as -- and that's come before the Court.

We would hope that on the LBIE front, which is the largest, we're making significant headway with LBIE, and I'm cautiously optimistic that we will soon have something to report on the LBIE front as well. So I think the foreign

receivers are coming along, and I think our patience is paying off.

The point number 2, our second objective is to -- is really to attack the direct claims of LBHI. That is underway, how do we go from the 210 that are filed to our estimate of 112 billion.

The third priority is really to focus on the LBHI direct creditors and the domestic creditors and the compromise that would be made by the domestic creditors to the LBHI estate. And those negotiations and discussions are ongoing.

At the same time, the fourth point, if we cannot reach agreement, then, as Mr. Miller points out, we may be back with a different alternative. But it's our hope that we can find a compromise solution with the various parties.

Timetables: We are -- we hope to complete the bilateral negotiations with the foreign affiliates in the next sixty days. We will -- at the same time, we will be engaging domestic stakeholders and trying to clean up the direct claims, hopefully settling some of those -- some of the direct claim -- holdings direct claims, with an intention of filing a new disclosure statement and having a plan confirmed by the end of the first quarter. Obviously the key there will no longer be the foreign administrators; after sixty days it will be whether or not the domestic subsidiary creditors and LBHI can get together on this compromise. And we are trying to be the

Honest John in bringing about that compromise.

Any questions, Your Honor?

THE COURT: I do have one question as it relates to the last point you made concerning the potential time-consuming problem of dealing domestically with the claims of creditors at different subsidiary levels. A few months ago, partly as a result of an objection that was filed by counsel for the ad hoc committee in the parent case, there was some discussion on the record of a protocol or some means to facilitate communication in a formal way. I deferred action with respect to that and left it to the debtors to propose something -- it doesn't need to be publicly proposed -- that would satisfy some of the concerns that had been expressed on the record at that time. In fact, there were a number of lawyers who were coming forward who wanted to reserve rights or to express themselves, and I effectively said 'This isn't the time for that.'

To what extent is there, either in process, a formalized means to share information that will facilitate these discussions, or some other process that you can share with me that will moderate some of the potential for discovery judicial proceedings of one sort or another relating to the process of getting information from one party to another and having what amounts to a completely transparent system for discussing these issues?

MR. MARSAL: Well, the -- I can answer that in part,

Your Honor, that certain of the constituencies are actually hired professionals and those professionals to represent them. We have been meeting with those professionals periodically to download information. I mean, you've got one group which wants to argue substantive consolidation, so they want all the facts that might help them on a substantive-consolidation argument, and you've got another group that's separate and they want the information that will help reinforce their position. We've been working on that score, but that's pretty much the issue as relates to today. I mean, that's pretty much where the advisors are honing in on.

As to a process, we are actively in discussions with the subcommittees representing LBT, LBSF and LBHI. And there's no shortage of input, trust me on that score. And -- but what we've tried to do is, again, we've tried to meet with these people and to share information, provided they will -- they're not -- we're staying away from asset values because we don't see this as anything other than a pot plan. If you want to know about asset values, then you could run amuck of maybe you're trying to do something other than -- you know, there's market implications to that, so as long as we stay away from the assets side and focus on the claims side, we're pretty open with people trying to explain to them where the negotiations are.

Other than that, Your Honor, there's nothing more

Page 51 formal, I mean, other than being responsive. 1 THE COURT: Mr. Miller, do --2 MR. MILLER: Your Honor --3 THE COURT: -- do you wish to comment? 4 MR. MILLER: If I may inter -- responding specifically 5 6 to your question, which arose at another omnibus hearing, in 7 connection -- there is no formal process, but there have been NDA agreements entered into with most of these ad hoc 9 alliances, committees or whatever they call themselves. 10 THE COURT: Groups. 11 MR. MILLER: Groups. Anything to get away from 2019. Part of the problem, Your Honor, is that most people 12 13 don't want to be restricted. So the process -- the formal process is that those groups can hire a financial advisor and 14 investment banker, and the investment banker or financial 15 16 advisor has access to the material. And that process is going 17 forward. There are regular meetings. Information is being distributed. A data room has been created. There is a 18 19 constant stream of information going into the data room, and 20 that's available to these groups that have entered into NDA 21 agreements. 22 So, responding to Your Honor's comments at the last hearing, there have been tremendous efforts in that respect. 23 And so far, Your Honor, we basically have not heard any 24 25 complaints.

Page 52 Good. I'm sure if there are complaints, THE COURT: I'll hear about that. MR. MARSAL: That's all I have, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well --MR. MARSAL: Do you have any questions? THE COURT: -- that's quite a lot. I want to express my appreciation for a very comprehensive report which I find very helpful, and I hope other parties-in-interest find it as helpful as I have found I won't hold you to another one of these presentations in terms of scheduling a date for one, but to the extent that there are major developments in the case that in your judgment you think should be reported in a public fashion, these omnibus hearings represent a natural opportunity for public information-sharing, and it's very obvious in the number of people here that this is a subject of great public interest. So, thank you very much. MR. MARSAL: Thank you. THE COURT: I think I'm going to take this occasion to just give people who wish to go about their business elsewhere and leave the bankruptcy court, either in the courtroom

upstairs or in this courtroom, and who have no need to stay or no desire to stay to hear the remainder of this morning's omnibus hearing, to leave. And what we're going to do is take about a five-minute recess to allow people to reposition

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Page 53 themselves, and we'll resume in about just five minutes. 1 we're adjourned for five. 2 MR. MILLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 3 (Recess from 10:50 a.m. until 11:02 a.m.) 4 THE COURT: Please be seated. 5 6 Mr. Miller. 7 MR. MILLER: Good morning again, Your Honor. Returning now, Your Honor, to the agenda for the omnibus 8 hearing scheduled for today, there are two uncontested matters 9 on the agenda, Your Honor: One, number 2, is the debtors' 10 11 motion for authorization to reject certain executory contracts. There are no objections to that motion, Your Honor. It's on 12 the calendar because the form of order has been revised 13 slightly to add a provision that claims must be filed within 14 15 thirty days after the date of rejection, or in such agreed time 16 as the debtors may agree to. That's the only change, Your 17 Honor. THE COURT: That's fine. I took a look at the motion. 18 19 It seems --20 MR. MILLER: The second --THE COURT: -- routine. 21 22 MR. MILLER: -- item on the uncontested motions, Your Honor, is the motion of Taipei Fubon Commercial Bank, Ltd. I 23 24 believe Morrison & Foerster represents the bank, Your Honor. 25 MS. MOLISON: Good morning, Your Honor. Stacy Molison

Page 54 from Morrison & Foerster, on behalf of Taipei Fubon. 1 Your Honor, this is a motion to remove a consent-to-2 transfer provision from within a loan document. There have 3 been no objections to the motion, and the relief requested is 4 similar to that that the Court granted to another lender in 5 6 April 2010. 7 THE COURT: Is it really removing the provision, or it's simply giving the ability to transfer notwithstanding the 8 provision? 9 MS. MOLISON: The latter, Your Honor. 10 11 THE COURT: Okay. You can --MS. MOLISON: In March 2005, Taipei Fu --12 13 THE COURT: It's unopposed, and the relief is granted. MS. MOLISON: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. I have a 14 form of order. 15 16 THE COURT: Why don't you --17 MS. MOLISON: Can I hand it up? THE COURT: Why don't you collect it with the other 18 19 forms of order to be submitted today through debtors' counsel, 20 and it can be submitted at the end of the hearing. MS. MOLISON: Okay. May I be excused? 21 THE COURT: You may. 22 MS. MOLISON: Thank you, Your Honor. 23 24 MR. PEREZ: Good morning, Your Honor. Alfredo Perez 25 on behalf of the debtors.

Your Honor, the next two matters on the agenda are the bank settlement motions, one with Aurora and one with Woodlands. We did receive several objections, comment, and we've made some further modifications to the form of order. We only received one objection, Mr. Kuntz, who is here in the courtroom.

But if I could go through the presentation. We did file a form of declaration for Mr. Lambert.

THE COURT: I read that declaration.

MR. PEREZ: Okay. And so, Your Honor, if I could kind of go through the motion, deal with the things that we've agreed on, and then Mr. Kuntz will be the only remaining objecting party.

In essence, Your Honor, by these two motions, we finally get to the point where we're having a global settlement with respect to the issues that have really plagued the case since the very beginning, and that is the obligations that LBHI and the Lehman debtors had with respect to these two banks; one is a savings bank and the other one is what is called a loan production bank, Woodlands Bank.

We were first here, Your Honor, in February of '09, and since that time we have put in substantial funds, and continue to put in substantial funds. Attached to Mr.

Lambert's declaration was a list of all the contributions which we either had made or which we had -- which we intend to make

by means of this motion in order to support the banks to allow them to, in essence, with respect to Aurora, continue to operate in the ordinary course of business so it can be sold and, with respect to Woodlands, also continue to operate so that it can either be sold or liquidated.

Your Honor, the matters involving the banks and the fact that they were so intertwined with all the Lehman debtors is very complex. We attached to the motion all of the various proofs of claim that had been filed. There are numerous, numerous claims by various Lehman entities that had claims against the banks. And in addition to that, Your Honor, there were the very substantial 2.2 billion dollar claims filed both by the OTS and by Aurora against LBHI on account of their -- the master forward agreement, which the OTS takes the position is in essence a capital maintenance guarantee, Your Honor.

Both of these banks -- both of these cases, Your
Honor, if you looked at the banks separately, they would
constitute among the largest bankruptcy cases in the country,
with assets almost totaling eight or nine billion dollars. So
these are very substantial entities. And this resolution has
taken a long time. I think the last -- maybe not the last
time, but maybe two times ago when I was here, I thought we
were going to be here on this final resolution a lot sooner
than we have been. But it's just taken a long time as a result
of this very, very extensive process to resolve all of these

things.

Your Honor, both proposals have been submitted to the appropriate regulatory agencies: the OTS as it relates to Aurora; the FDIC as it relates to Woodlands. And obviously the FDIC also has some input on Aurora because it is the insurance company that would guarantee it. And the applications were submitted in December of last year. To our knowledge, those applications are -- we've done all the work that is needed in order for them to approve the applications. We've made changes, at their request, to the applications and to the business plans and how we would conduct the business for the next eighteen months.

The -- based on our understanding, the Federal Home

Loan Bank has to determine -- I'm sorry, the Federal Reserve

has to determine whether these transactions constitute an

affiliate transaction under 13A. They either will need to

grant a waiver or say that they're excluded from that. And to

our knowledge, that seems to be the one issue that still needs

to be resolved so that the transactions can proceed. But I

think having them approved by this Court will make that

determination go quicker. But as far as our primary regulators

are concerned, to our knowledge there's nothing additional that

we need to do in order for the final approval to be granted.

THE COURT: Do the regulators know about this hearing?

I mean, it's obviously very public. Have they taken a position

with respect to this hearing? Do you have any knowledge concerning their timetable? Because part of what seems to be going on here is a setting of the table so that they can have no excuses for not acting.

MR. PEREZ: Correct, Your Honor. To our knowledge, as it relates to our primary regulators, which are the OTS and the FDIC, we do not believe that there's anything left for us to do in order for them to act. And we've addressed all their concerns. We've addressed -- we've made modifications to the applications. To our knowledge, we've done everything that we need to do for them to act --

THE COURT: But effectiveness is really not about what I do; it's about what they ultimately approve.

MR. PEREZ: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PEREZ: Correct, Your Honor. Your Honor, there are various intercreditor issues implicated by the banks. And during the last two weeks, we've spent a tremendous amount of time with the ad hocs, with -- and with White & Case and their financial advisor, as well as some of the ad hocs, going through what are clearly interdebtor issues related to the banks and the way that they operated.

We have amended the form of order to address really a full reservation of rights not only as to each of the debtors, whatever claims they may have, but also a full reservation of

rights as to the allocation of the cost and the benefits that are being derived from the settlement. And at some point in the future, obviously we either have to come to an agreement on that or we're going to be back before the Court. But vis-a-vis the banks and vis-a-vis the regulators, this is a full and final settlement. It's really the -- only the intercreditor -- I'm sorry, the interdebtor issues that are being preserved, and they're being fully preserved.

And I was chided the other day for perhaps being imprecise at one of the hearings, talking about the fact that, you know, a certain debtor was the only one that had a benefit and entitlement to it. As the Court is aware, most of the motions that I've been bringing up in the last several months have involved situations where there have been questions about the various rights as between the various debtors. So to the extent that I might have said something at a hearing which is not reflective of a full reservation of rights that you may have in the orders, obviously the orders are what controls.

And I wasn't intending to affect or change the orders. I told them I'd put that on the record, but --

THE COURT: Well, I can't tell you from memory which one you're talking of. Was this Sun and Moon?

MR. PEREZ: It was Sun and Moon, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Then I guess I can do it from

25 memory.

Page 60 MR. PEREZ: Yeah, you do remember. 1 And there was -- and actually it was in that hearing; 2 it was both Sun and Moon and Innkeepers, Your Honor. But the 3 orders do reflect a full reservation of rights. With that, Your Honor, unless the Court has any 5 questions about the deal -- I think the deal's been in front of 6 7 the Court for a long time, and it was reflected in the plan of reorganization that we filed that this -- that the amounts would have been contributed. 9 10 With that, Your Honor, let me try to address the objections, and then --11 THE COURT: Before you get to the objections, I assume 12 13 that you're relying on the declaration --MR. PEREZ: Absolutely, Your Honor. 14 15 THE COURT: -- of Mr. Lambert? 16 MR. PEREZ: We're relying on the declaration to put forth the business reason for our entry into the --17 18 THE COURT: Is there any objection to my receipt of 19 that declaration as a proffer of what Mr. Lambert would say if 20 called as a witness in support of this? 21 (No response) THE COURT: There's no objection. I accept the 22 declaration. 23 (Declaration of Douglas Lambert was hereby received into 24 25 evidence, in lieu of direct testimony, as a Debtors' exhibit,

as of this date.)

THE COURT: And I may have a question of Mr. Lambert, in particular as it relates to Exhibit A.

MR. PEREZ: Yes, Your Honor.

Your Honor, the first objection that we received was from Clayton Services. Clayton Services basically filed a statement reserving their rights. They are -- there is a potential avoidance action against them, and the debtors, by means of my statement, confirmed that nothing in the motion or order affects the rights or defenses that Clayton may have with respect to the avoidance action that could be commenced by the debtor, including any rights or claims that Clayton may have against Aurora in connection therewith, and that all of the debtors' rights and defenses, Aurora's rights and defenses, and Clayton's rights and defenses with respect to that -- any potential action, are reserved. So nothing in this motion and order is intended to affect any situation with Clayton Services.

Your Honor, secondly, we did receive a pleading from Freddie Mac. We have made some changes in the order, which I will hand the Court. But to reflect basically -- and I also have a statement to read into the record. But basically Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are government-sponsored entities. Ginnie Mae is a government corporation as opposed to a government-sponsored entity. They all have contractual rights

vis-a-vis approval of the transfer of the master servicing rights. And by means of this motion, as we stated in there, we're going to seek their consent in order to do that. And they have -- as being, you know, government-sponsored or in the sense of government corporation, they have those rights.

So by means of this motion, we're not affecting -we're not trying to affect their rights, their consent rights,
and by means of this motion, likewise we're not affecting their
rights generally that they may have pursuant to their
contracts. So, in essence, neither the motion nor the order
affect those rights.

So with respect to Freddie Mac, LBHI owns a portfolio of mortgage servicing rights with respect to certain Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae sponsored residential mortgages. LBHI appointed Aurora (sic) Services, LLC, or ALS, as a subservicer of those loans, and the servicing is currently being provided by ALS. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, LBHI proposes to transfer such mortgage servicing rights to FSB, subject to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae -- and Fannie Mae is in conservatorship -- and their conservators' consent.

Now, LBHI agrees that it will not, without such consent, transfer to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae mortgage servicing rights to Aurora or Aurora Loan Services or their affiliates, or assign the income receivable or -- received or receivable by LBHI that is attributable to or derived from such

servicing to the FSB or Aurora Services or any such affiliate entity for a period of 120 days or such period as may be extended by the parties so that the parties can try to obtain the consent of Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and their conservator for the transfer of such servicing rights to the FSB or Aurora Services. And the parties reserve all their rights with respect to such transfer of the mortgage servicing rights or any income in connection therewith, in the event that any agreement in respect to such consent is not reached. nothing herein constitutes a waiver of any of Freddie Mac's, Fannie Mae's or their conservators' rights or claims regarding the subject residential mortgage loans, or constitute a waiver of any of the conservators' rights under the Federal Housing Enterprises (sic) Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 as amended by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, Public Law 110-289.

Your Honor, I believe, with that statement in the record as well as the change that we've made to the order, that the concerns raised by Freddie Mac are obviated.

THE COURT: Is there anyone here acting on behalf of Freddie Mac who can confirm that the statements just read into the record will be sufficient for these purposes?

MS. REE: Good morning, Your Honor. Sophia Ree from Landman Corsi Ballaine & Ford, on behalf of Freddie Mac.

Based on what was read into the record, Freddie Mac has no objections, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Fine. Thank you.

MR. PEREZ: And, Your Honor, I believe that Ginnie
Mae, who's represented by the U.S. Attorney -- we have agreed
to insert -- the way we had drafted the order, we talked about
government-sponsored entities that had this full reservation.
There is a concern about including Ginnie Mae as one of the
government-sponsored entities. So we've just flipped the
order. Unfortunately it's -- I have it handwritten, but we've
just flipped the order. So we put Ginnie Mae and the
government-sponsored entities Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. But
the same reservation and the same comments that I've made with
respect to Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac also -- I'm sorry, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, also apply to Ginnie Mac. And I believe
counsel also has a statement, and I think, with that, that
resolves their concern.

MR. CORDARO: Thank you, Mr. Perez.

Good morning, Your Honor. Joseph Cordaro, Assistant
United States Attorney, on behalf of Ginnie Mae. And, yes,
that -- there is an issue. Ginnie Mae technically is not a
GSE. It's a government corporation. Hence, the change, that
Mr. Perez just mentioned to Your Honor, to the order. And just
to confirm what I believe Mr. Perez told Your Honor, that
there's nothing in the motion, or the order granting the
motion, that modifies or restricts any rights of Ginnie Mae
under any agreement with either the debtors or Aurora Bank FSB.

Page 65 And we come to that agreement; I believe Mr. Perez articulated 1 it. So --2 3 THE COURT: Understood. MR. CORDARO: Thank you, Your Honor. 4 MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, next we come to the statement 5 6 filed by the ad hocs. I think that I've addressed it. The --7 we have, at their request, gone back and done -- and are doing basically further due diligence on some of the issues that 9 they're concerned -- that process is continuing and we will 10 finalize that process before the closing takes place; it's just a matter of getting the documents. The debtor and its counsel 11 who's handling this feel very comfortable that the issues --12 13 first of all, that they've already looked at the issues raised, and that is any potentially contingent liability that you might 14 15 be creating by the transfer of the servicing rights; feel that 16 that issue is -- doesn't exist, and they're going back again and confirming to themselves that -- again, they confirmed that 17 18 the issue doesn't exist. 19 And we did make --20 THE COURT: I'm confused. I'm sorry to break in, Mr. I'm confused by what you just said. Is there a 21 condition subsequent that needs to be satisfied --22 MR. PEREZ: Your Honor --23 24 THE COURT: -- in order to make the objection of the 25 ad hoc committee go away?

Page 66 MR. PEREZ: No, Your Honor, I don't believe that it's 1 2 a condition subsequent. We are endeavoring and think that -as a result of the fact that we're going to have a little bit 3 of time before we have final regulatory approval, to finish the 4 5 work that we started again last week. But we've committed to 6 do that and report to them before we close or report to them 7 where we are when we're going to close. THE COURT: And this is the group represented by Mr. 9 Uzzi? 10 MR. PEREZ: Excuse me? 11 THE COURT: This is the group represented by Mr. Uzzi? MR. PEREZ: 12 Yes. 13 THE COURT: I'd like to hear from him. Well, I'm going to hear from his partner, from Mr. Shore. 14 15 I just want to understand the status of your objection 16 at this point. MR. SHORE: Sure. And I can either address -- I had a 17 couple of statements to make on the record today with respect 18 19 to both the motions, and I can table them for now. But with 20 respect to the specific question, there's no condition subsequent. We trust that the debtors, having done the due 21 22 diligence, if they find something in there that would require them to reassess the motion or going forward with the 23 24 transaction, they're perfectly capable of pulling the plug on

that transaction, because they're only seeking authorization

and not a direction to do it. But as long as we understand that they are going through that process, we have no objection.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. PEREZ: So, Your Honor, I think that that addresses all of the objections, other than the one filed by Mr. Kuntz.

THE COURT: Mr. Kuntz, do you wish to speak?

MR. KUNTZ: Thank you, Your Honor. First I'd like to clarify one thing. I believe Mr. Miller spoke this morning earlier and he referred to Washington Mutual in relationship to Wachovia. I believe Washington Mutual was acquired by JPMorgan. And Wachovia was acquired by Wells Fargo. I know this only because I was a -- I had my credit card with Washington Mutual.

What concerns me here is the use of additional estate funds versus estate assets. And yesterday afternoon I filed, in accordance with Your Honor's prior comment, a notice to call the deponent to the stand, and I've already provided a punch list of perhaps fifteen questions, because I really don't think that they've done their homework, they've expanded all the options that are available. It's just simply the government wants the money, here, we'll give them two billion to keep them happy. For instance, I put in 'What about the Park Avenue mortgage?' From my understanding, that Park Avenue mortgage could be transferred to these banks. They could then take that

mortgage and go to the Federal Reserve, Federal Home Loan

Savings Bank, and get 6-, 7-, 8-, 900 hundred million dollars

in cash.

As I put in my prior papers, these are run-of-the-mill institutions. There's nothing special about them that requires a billion more of cash put up to keep them in a situation in a world where the business model of lending money doesn't really exist anymore. I mean, just yesterday I read that General Motors Acceptance Corp. has suspended filing all foreclosures in the entire country. So what's going to happen to Woodlands and what's going to happen to Aurora if all of a sudden there's another billion, here's another billion? Whoops, all your mortgages now are suspended for two years. If the administration comes out and says 'We have a crisis. Guess what, guys? Your mortgages are now suspended,' what's going to happen to the cash flow?

THE COURT: Is your objection, Mr. Kuntz, that you question the business judgment of the debtors in proposing to satisfy some of the regulatory problems impacting these two institutions by investing capital into these assets for a future sale or disposition?

MR. KUNTZ: Cash.

THE COURT: Is that -- did I --

MR. KUNTZ: Not assets.

THE COURT: Did I correctly summarize what is your

Page 69 objection? 1 MR. KUNTZ: Cash, not assets. And I have -- I'd like 2 to call the witness to the stand and ask him. I said have 3 you -- I filed a notice, Your Honor, yesterday, as you 4 5 instructed previously that 'If you want to call the witness to 6 the stand, you have to file with the Local Rule, ' which I did. 7 THE COURT: Okay, so you want to examine Mr. Lambert, is that right? 8 9 MR. KUNTZ: Yes, sir. Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Lambert is here. 10 MR. KUNTZ: And I would like that the record reflect 11 that yesterday I went to mail copies of the time-stamped 12 13 documents, and the mailing standards from the Whitehall Post Office wouldn't accept them. So I have a copy for the debtors' 14 counsel --15 16 THE COURT: What is it you're handing to Mr. Miller? 17 MR. KUNTZ: It's the time-stamped copy of the notice to call the deponent to the stand. 18 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 Is there any objection to having Mr. Lambert appear as a witness? 21 22 MR. MILLER: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Fine. 23 24 Mr. Lambert, why don't you come forward? Yeah, come 25 to the stand.

Page 70 And before questions are asked by Mr. Kuntz, I had 1 some questions that I noted I wanted to ask Mr. Lambert, so I'm 2 3 going to ask those questions first. MR. KUNTZ: I understand, Your Honor, but I just --5 can I provide a copy -- I have the questions here. Could I 6 provide a copy of -- to Mr. Lambert, or counsel can also? 7 THE COURT: Well, ordinarily you would just ask them. MR. KUNTZ: Well, I understand, but these are, like --I didn't want to attack them by surprise. And also one other 9 thing: In the interest of judicial economy, as Your Honor is 10 11 aware, my standing has been challenged now finally, and there were three minor matters which I withdrew my objections to. 12 13 But this is such a large number, I felt that I should at least make my objection known. I mean, a billion dollars --14 15 THE COURT: Well, why don't you --16 MR. KUNTZ: -- in fees --17 THE COURT: -- why don't you --MR. KUNTZ: -- have been paid --18 19 THE COURT: -- sit down for a moment --20 MR. KUNTZ: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: -- and I'm just going to ask Mr. Lambert a 22 couple of questions that I had. But, first, since you're here -- you've spoken to the 23 24 Court before from the podium. I'm going to swear you as a 25 Please stand up and raise your right hand.

Entered 10/21/10 12:24:14 Main Document Page 71 1 (Witness sworn) THE COURT: Be seated please. Mr. Lambert, I took a look at your declaration, which is now in evidence, and I just 3 am interested in the cost benefit analysis that's attached to 5 your declaration in particular. And I'm looking for -- in 6 effect, more detail --7 THE WITNESS: Sure. THE COURT: -- if you can provide it. THE WITNESS: I'll try. 9 THE COURT: My best recollection from what I saw is 10 11 that you estimate approximately a three billion dollar overall advantage to the estate by virtue of these transactions, and 12 13 I'd like to understand, since it's a very spare cost benefit analysis, what assumptions were made in order to reach that 14 15 conclusion --16 THE WITNESS: Sure. THE COURT: -- and to understand something more about 17 your analysis. 18 THE WITNESS: As you know, back in probably fourth 19 20 quarter of '08 and the early days of the first quarter of '09, we had many discussions with Debtors' counsel, counsel to the 21 22 UCC, regulatory counsel, and expressed to the Court, I think, 23 in a presentation that Mr. Marsal made in February of '09, the risk to the estate of the regulators bringing a 365(o) claim 24

against the estate. And at that time, I believe we estimated

that potential exposure to be approximately 2.7 billion, I think, at the time.

We -- and that obviously had weighed on many of the decisions that we've made since the commencement of this case. Again, while I think we've always felt -- or the debtor, as well as the banks, have felt that there were adequate defenses against that claim, certainly there was a concern that, if brought by the federal government, they could be successful, and the detriment to the estate would be significant.

The analysis that I attached to my declaration assumes today that we will be -- the estate and/or various debtors of the estate will be receiving back various pledged collateral that was pledged to both banks. And, again, we look at the assumed current value of that collateral coming back. Further, as I think we've presented in the plan of reorganization and disclosure statement, we believe that, in the case of Woodlands, it is most likely that we will liquidate that institution in place and ultimately surrender the charter for that industrial lending corp. -- bank. And with respect to Aurora Bank, we believe that it is most likely that that institution will be sold to a third party in order to maximize value and recovery to the estate.

So when taking together either the liquidation through liquidation in place or sale proceeds of the two institutions, together with the value of the collateral coming back, I think

we reasonably expect that value to be approximately two billion dollars today; and, you know, potentially some further upside to those numbers.

We look at, again, the avoidance of the loss to the estate of approximately -- 2.7 billion, I believe, is the number; I don't have the schedule right in front of me -- which suggests a value and/or claims avoided, aggregating 4.7 billion. Assuming that the motions that are before the Court today are approved and the estates go forward with making the final contributions, we believe, in the aggregate on a gross basis, we will have contributed cash, other assets, as well as the cancellation of indebtedness, to the tune of 1.6 billion to both institutions, which suggests to us -- and we believe that -- you know, it was a conclusion that we had in early '09 and it's the same conclusion that we draw today that we will have saved or preserved value to the estate of approximately, you know, 3.1 billion dollars by the actions that have been taken to date as well as if we take action pursuant to the motions before the Court, if that answers your question.

THE COURT: Yeah, so the essence of this is that there's an avoided substantial claim of 2.7 billion dollars and a realization as a result of disposition --

THE WITNESS: Correct.

THE COURT: -- of underlying assets that, on a net basis, you estimate is about 3.1 billion dollars to the benefit

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Page 74 of the estate? 1 2 THE WITNESS: That is correct. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 3 THE WITNESS: You're welcome. 4 THE COURT: Mr. Kuntz, if you have questions, this is 5 6 the time. 7 MR. KUNTZ: Thank you, Your Honor. CROSS-EXAMINATION 9 BY MR. KUNTZ: Good morning, Mr. Lambert. 10 Ο. 11 Α. Good morning. Have you worked for a bank? 12 Q. 13 I have. Α. Which bank? 14 Q. National Bank of North America. 15 16 Are you an officer of either Aurora or Woodlands? Q. No, I'm not. 17 Α. Are you a director of either Aurora or Woodlands? 18 I'm a director of both institutions. 19 20 Q. When the settlement was proposed with JPMorgan, was any part of the Woodlands or Aurora alleged equity considered as 21 22 part of or in place of the 500 million in cash paid to 23 JPMorgan? I'm not sure I understand your question or the 24 25 connectivity between the CDA with JPMorgan and the banks.

- 1 Q. There was a settlement previously approved by this Court.
- 2 As part of that settlement, the debtor gave JPMorgan 500
- 3 | million in cash.
- 4 A. Correct.
- 5 Q. Was it ever considered to give part of the Woodlands or
- 6 Aurora equity to JPMorgan in place of the cash?
- 7 A. I was not involved with those negotiations, but I would
- 8 | suspect that JPMorgan was looking for liquid assets, cash, in
- 9 connection with that transaction. So I'm not sure that anybody
- 10 | considered turning over equity value of either institution to
- 11 JPMorgan.
- 12 Q. Has a spinoff of Aurora or Woodlands to Lehman creditors
- 13 been considered?
- 14 A. That is a potential option in the disposition of one or
- 15 both banks.
- 16 Q. What effect would the transfer of the Park Avenue
- 17 | mortgages have on the Aurora or Woodlands balance sheet?
- 18 MR. PEREZ: Objection, Your Honor. Irrelevant.
- 19 THE COURT: I don't understand the question either.
- MR. KUNTZ: Thank you.
- 21 | Q. The debtor has, it's my understanding, almost a billion
- 22 dollars in mortgages on the, I think, 237 Park Avenue building.
- THE COURT: Well --
- 24 O. If --
- 25 | THE COURT: -- I sustain the objection. It's not --

Page 76 it's conflating one asset with the need to cure some regulatory 1 2 problems affecting other assets. And it's really an 3 inappropriate question, so I sustain the objection. MR. KUNTZ: Then I'll skip to the next three. 5 Was there ever any consideration of transferring the 6 junior mortgage on the Hancock Center to Aurora or Woodlands? 7 MR. PEREZ: Same objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Same ruling, and --MR. KUNTZ: Thank you, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: -- the objection is sustained. 10 11 Has there ever been a consideration of transferring the empty building in Stamford, Connecticut to Woodlands or Aurora 12 to bolster the balance sheet? 13 MR. PEREZ: Same objection, Your Honor. 14 15 THE COURT: And same ruling. 16 I mean, Mr. Kuntz, I understand what you're getting at, but --17 MR. KUNTZ: Your Honor, I take the objection. I'll 18 19 just simply finish my questions and I'll be done. Thank you. 2.0 THE COURT: Okay. How much ground rent is being paid to General Re, if you 21 Q. 22 know? I do not know. 23 24 Ο. Are you aware that the allowed claims in the Stamford, 25 Connecticut building have been acquired by Barclays?

Page 77 MR. PEREZ: Same -- could I just have a running 1 objection on relevancy, Your Honor, so I don't have --2 3 MR. KUNTZ: I believe this goes to the business-judgment rule, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Well, without limiting your ability to ask 5 6 questions, the questions do need to relate to the substance of 7 the motion that's before the Court. And the motion that's before the Court is very specific; it's a series of settlements 9 that are designed to cure certain regulatory problems that have plaqued Woodlands and Aurora from the very beginning of these 10 11 bankruptcy cases. MR. KUNTZ: I understand, Your Honor, and --12 13 THE COURT: And you're talking about a series of other assets and transactions. 14 MR. KUNTZ: Mr. Lambert is a senior member of the 15 16 debtors' management, and they continue to roll out this 17 business-judgment rule, and I'm simply asking questions. instance, it seems to me that if the Court approved and allowed 18 19 claims to Bank of America, a/k/a Security Pacific, and then 20 Barclays acquired that claim and now Barclays is being sued by -- for I don't know how much money, that this would be 21 22 something senior management would be aware of. I was shocked when I read that. 23

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Page 78 Court. 1 MR. KUNTZ: Well, then I'll -- let me skip down. 2 BY MR. KUNTZ: 3 Has there ever been a consideration of transferring the Sun and Moon property to Woodlands or Aurora to bolster the 5 balance sheet? 6 7 Α. Well --MR. KUNTZ: Same objection? Has the concept of investing one billion dollars in 9 Citibank stock, together with a transfer of Aurora or Woodlands 10 to Citi, ever been considered? 11 Are you -- could you restate the question? I'm sorry, I'm 12 13 not sure I understand. Has the concept of investing the one-billion-dollars-plus 14 15 that's proposed to be put into Woodlands or Aurora -- has a 16 consideration been made of buying Citibank stock and then, in essence, transferring the Woodlands/Aurora problems to 17 18 Citibank? 19 I'm not sure I understand how buying stock of another 20 regulated institution would in turn transfer liability/obligation to Citibank. 21 If Citibank acquired these two institutions, then the big 22 bad government claim would go away, as I understand it. 23 24 MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, I'm going to object again.

Relevancy.

Page 79 THE COURT: Well, I think you could also object to the 1 2 fact that it's not a question. It was just a statement of Mr. 3 Kuntz. It's sustained. MR. KUNTZ: Well, at this point, Your Honor, I can see that, you know, the Court really doesn't want to hear what's 5 really going on in the debtors' minds, and --6 7 THE COURT: No, what I want to hear, and I'm giving you the opportunity to do it, are questions that relate to the 9 motion. 10 MR. KUNTZ: Yes, and the questions relate to the 11 business-judgment rule behind putting another billion dollars --12 13 THE COURT: That would mean --MR. KUNTZ: -- of cash --14 15 THE COURT: That would mean that you would have to ask 16 questions about these institutions, about their capital adequacy --17 18 MR. KUNTZ: Yes, that's why --19 THE COURT: -- about the kinds of claims that the 20 government might make under 365(o), whether or not those claims are in fact hundred-cent-dollar claims. 21 22 MR. KUNTZ: I'm not --THE COURT: Those would be real relevant questions. 23 24 You haven't asked those questions. 25 MR. KUNTZ: The question, Your Honor, as I understand

Page 80 it, is the inadequacy of the balance sheet of the subject 1 2 banks. And if a billion-dollar mortgage was transferred, not 3 cash, mortgage was transferred to these banks, and the banks could go to the Federal Reserve or whoever and borrow against 4 5 that collateral, then it seems to me that that would solve the 6 accounting question that the government has. 7 And by the way, we are here because the federal government, as Mr. Miller said, left Lehman out in the cold. 8 9 Right? At this point, Your Honor, I'll just leave it at that. 10 I don't have any more to say. THE COURT: Okay. 11 Is there any --12 13 MR. PEREZ: I have nothing further, Your Honor. THE COURT: -- any examination of the witness? 14 15 MR. PEREZ: I don't have any questions for Mr. 16 Lambert. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lambert, thank you. 18 19 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 20 THE COURT: You're excused. (Witness excused) 21 MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, by way of argument, I wanted 22 to highlight a couple of things. Number one, we did start this 23 24 process back in February of '09, trying to address -- at the 25 time, you know, there was a very material chance that these

banks would be seized. And we have put in substantial amounts of money, culminating in the 477 million dollars that we propose to put in by means of this motion.

I do want to highlight the fact that, as against Aurora, the -- I'm sorry, by Aurora, on account of Aurora, there is a 2.2 billion dollar claim asserted by the bank.

There's a 2.2 billion dollar claim -- there are two 2.2 billion dollar claims asserted by the OTS. Those claims, one of which is on account of 365(o), which would result -- if that claim was found to be valid, would result in a 507(a)(9) priority.

So those would be one-hundred-cent dollars that would have to be paid, same as if it were a fully secured claim. In addition, Your Honor, there is a 23(a) claim as a result of a concern about an affiliate transaction.

We did attach to the motion all the various claims that were filed against the entities, against Woodlands, which total in excess of a billion dollars. And after you reduce them for duplicates, it's something less than that. But they are very significant.

This is a very difficult situation. This was not a situation that -- this has been one of the more difficult situations that the bank has faced -- I'm sorry, that Lehman has faced, for two reasons. First of all, we've had a very volatile environment. And these banks, when they were char -- when they were purchased by Lehman, went on mark-to-market

accounting, which was the way Lehman accounted. And generally banks don't do mark-to-market accounting because when you've got a loan that's paying interest and you realize on it, there's no need to mark to market as you would a securities firm that has volatile securities.

So we had a situation where, although the assets were performing as a result of the accounting principles, the fairvalue accounting, you ended up marking it and there was a real chance that they were going to be taken, coupled with the potential priority claims, coupled with the fact that, under -- because LBHI was a bank holding company, the FDIC, if it stepped in and took one bank, was authorized by statute to take the other bank. So it could have been a situation where not only would we not have had any assets left because of a fire sale liquidation, but there would also have been a very, very significant claim that would have had priority.

After many, many months of trying to negotiate this,

Your Honor, we've come before the Court, presenting this

proposal which we think is the way to really maximize value and

avoid significant potential priority claims.

That's all, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I'd like to hear from the creditors' committee because I know the committee supports the transaction; I'd like to know why.

MR. O'DONNELL: Your Honor, Dennis O'Donnell, Milbank,

Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors.

Your Honor, as you rightly point out, we've been here every time the debtors have been here for the past year and a half, supporting the previous infusions and currently support this final resolution. It hasn't been an easy task for the committee. I mean, the committee did not start out thinking that this was necessarily a good idea, and convincing the committee took time and effort, working with them, working on the legal issues in terms of the priority claims, and working -- having our financial advisors vet everything the debtors were doing in terms of the potential values here. But we got there. We got there sometime ago and we've been side by side with the debtors throughout this process, convinced that doing what we need to do here to get over the regulatory hurdles will result in value to be reaped from this investment.

We -- I would -- in the context -- I mean, as I say,
we -- it hasn't been an easy process. We know that this is a
lot of money. We know that this is a substantial investment,
has been and continues to be. We acknowledge some concerns in
terms of using the estates' assets with respect to an
investment that is not guaranteed, but there are no guaranteed
investments here. We believe that the debtors' business
judgment here in making this investment is the best viable
option at this point and should yield to substantial value in

the long term.

Commenting as well on Mr. Kuntz's potential substitution, and I think what he was -- his questions were going to were, were other -- whether -- did the estate -- did the committee consider the use of other assets here instead of cash for the other consideration that's being used, and the answer's yes, all options were considered. I think the answer with respect to the assets you were referring to, the real-estate ones, is that the government did want those types of assets. What they're getting -- I mean, what we ultimately settled on was the type of assets, the type of contributions that would be acceptable to the government. And we are where we are. We have a settlement before you, and that's the issue for the Court.

One further -- in terms of the fact that the regulators have not yet approved this, that is a concern, but not a great concern. We believe that there is enough momentum with the regulators for this to get done in short order. There's one minor hurdle, we believe, to get order, and that will be done. And nothing will happen with the settlement until that happens. We take comfort that this is a package deal and, if it's going to get done, it's going to get done as written with full approval by the regulators. And the money will not get invested without that approval.

And finally, Your Honor, on the allocation issues,

which we think have been resolved, or clarified at least, I think there was always an understanding that the proposed allocations of the benefits and burdens in the motion were subject to a reservation of rights. The order as modified does in fact make it very clear that they are subject to being revisited if need be. We think the allocations as proposed make some sense but, with the reservation of rights, everyone will have the opportunity to confirm that in the future.

And that's all I have to --

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

Does anyone else wish to be heard on this?

MR. SHORE: Chris Shore from White & Case, for the ad hoc group. I've got two things I'd like to focus on, and I'll try to be brief.

We look at the Aurora and Woodland settlement as having two pieces: First there's a bank settlement piece, which is the interface between the enterprise and the banks; and then there's a debtor settlement, which is the interface between each of the individual debtor estates and what's being resolved in the motion.

With respect to the bank motion -- or the bank settlement, that is, the interface between the debtor estates and the banks, we started out very concerned about the investment strategy, which is essentially a doubling-down and putting in a billion dollars of new equity in order to save old

equity. And it's not just a 365(o) issue. Obviously that has always been a concern, but be clear by this motion the debtors are accepting 365(o) liability, because they've entered into what is indisputably a capital maintenance agreement, which is -- so if anything bad goes on from now, that issue seems to be resolved.

It's also an issue of this is going in as equity. And the issues we had and the issues the debtors are working on and the questions we've been asking are what are the risks to that equity investment going into the banks, versus just leaving things as they are now and resolving the 365(o) liability as best we can as it exists. And we've worked with the debtors all last week. We had a number of calls over the weekend. The process is ongoing. But I think we've gotten ourselves to a fragile approval of the motion where the questions have been answered or are being answered, such that the nature of a very large equity investment to save old equity is something we can agree with.

With respect to the debtors' settlements, we appreciate that the statements are being made now that it wasn't intended to be a final allocation. We did have concerns with respect to two aspects of the motion: first, the manner in which the allocation of the costs were going to be done, in particular, for example, on the Woodlands side, the allocation of cost based upon bank-filed claims; and also there are going

to be a number of interdebtor asset transfers going on.

Again, we've had a lot of discussions with the debtors. They've given us comfort that it's not their intent to resolve those finally. And I think Mr. Miller's comments before are telling. He's standing up. Look, they recognize the issue. We see the issue. We're trying to reserve rights now.

So let me give you an example. There's an agreement in principle disclosed in the Aurora motion that LCPI is going to be purchasing Archstone loans at ninety percent of fair market value. Well, that settlement really was one individual acting on behalf of LBHI and LCPI, saying what is fair in this context for going back and forth, and ninety percent of fair market value -- our question's why not ninety-five percent -- I'm sure somebody else has a question why not eighty-five percent -- and more importantly, what is fair market value. I think if we've seen anything in this case, a lot of very sophisticated people can disagree as to how to make marks on an asset.

They may have come to the right settlement; they may have not. We weren't in a position, in the time given, to come up with a definitive view as to what the right allocations are. But we -- so we've agreed to a reservation of rights that lets the debtors proceed with a bank settlement and getting that done -- again, that's an important piece of this -- and that

allows the debtors to close their books provisionally. They have to do something with the accounting for the transaction that allows it to do it, but allows any party-in-interest, as part of some process at some point, to look at the bona fides of this and come up with an approval.

I suspect, just as far as keeping the Court apprised, that if the debtors go forward and transfer assets from LBHI to LCPI at this ninety percent of fair market value as they're calculating, we may have to come back to the Court on that. I just don't think that there's an agreement, just looking at it from an LBHI perspective, that that transfer at that price makes sense, and we're talking about hundreds of millions of dollars here.

I recognize, again, on behalf of the group, that these kind of reservations are cumbersome from a judicial economy standpoint. We'd like to wrap up all resolutions with respect to one subject matter at the same time. But at this time, we don't have anybody to negotiate. If the debtors recognize they can't come to a final settlement and there's nobody there for LCPI, there's really no way to resolve that issue without coming to the Court. And we apologize for, again, the reservations of rights and the need maybe to come back on that, but we don't have a structure.

I don't want to sound like a broken record, but there needs to be something in place. This is coming up consistently

and it's going to have to come up over time as this gets done, because I'm going to clarify two things from the State of the Estate address: This isn't a pot plan, per se, absent an agreed settlement. When we talk about assets and liabilities, distributions are going to be made out of estates, based on the assets and liabilities. If there are disputes as to who owns the asset or where the liability resides, or what price an asset was transferred, that's all going to have to be resolved at some point, and it's going to have to be resolved pursuant to some process.

The only other thing I'd like to add as far as the process as it exists today, I don't necessarily -- I guess I can agree that there are no disputes that have been brought before the Court on that. I don't think it's fair to say that there aren't disputes. We've been asking for documents since June. There has been a database set up. There are five hundred and, I think, seventy as of last count, documents in that database, substantially -- more than half of which are public documents.

So I don't think -- I think we have information bottlenecks now. There were issues with respect to signatures of NDAs and getting people engaged. The process is started. But from a disclosure standpoint, I think if that bottleneck doesn't open up and that there's more population with documentation, we may have to be back before the Court.

THE COURT: My door's always open. But to be clear,
Mr. Shore, because you used this occasion, and that's fine, to
in effect respond to some of the things that came up during the
State of the Estate section of this morning's hearing, but as
it relates to the motion that's currently before me and your
reservation of rights with respect particularly to allocation
issues, those rights having been reserved, your group having
examined this transaction with the perspective of -- actually
the same perspective as Mr. Kuntz; and not wanting to throw
good money after bad to preserve equity, old equity especially,
you're satisfied -- well, at least your group is satisfied,
that this is a reasonable transaction in respect of protecting
these banking assets?

MR. SHORE: Yes, we do (sic), Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I wanted to confirm that.

MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, I'm not sure I have any real response to Mr. Shore's comments, because they largely didn't have to do with the motion, but there is one thing that I would want to respond to, and that is that there was some indication that there was one person who was making all of these decisions. I mean, all of these decisions are made by groups of professionals, the committees involved. I mean, this is not something that some person dreams up by himself and wearing all kinds of hats. I mean, this is -- it's done very thoughtfully, with a lot of input by professionals who do this, or who are

trying to get to the right decision.

And with that, Your Honor, I don't have anything further.

THE COURT: All right.

Is there anything more?

(No response)

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THE COURT: This has been a problem that has been presented on a number of prior occasions, namely the need to provide infusions of equity to support Aurora and Woodlands and to bring these institutions properly within regulatory compliance. One of the problems, from the Court's perspective during each one of those prior occasions, and today is no exception, is that the role of the regulators has been somewhat obscure. We know they're there. We know that they need to take some kind of action to say yes to these various attempts to bring the institutions within regulatory compliance. even today I'm being asked to approve very significant transactions without knowing that the approval will lead, within some demonstrated period of time, to approval by the regulators themselves. In effect, as I said earlier during colloguy, I'm being asked to set in motion a process such that the regulators should have no reason to say no and shouldn't be in a position to say 'Well, wait a minute, you don't have bankruptcy court approval.' That approval will have been obtained as a result of today's hearing and so, presumably,

that will create some momentum toward bringing this to a final resolution.

I understand what's going on. I also understand some of Mr. Kuntz's concerns as an observer. But I am satisfied that the debtors are exercising well-informed business judgment in an area that is not free from doubt. The fact that the creditors' committee has been closely associated with this process for the last eighteen months and has presumably, through one of its subcommittees, been monitoring this and exercising independent judgment as a watchdog, and also considering the business judgment that's being proposed by the debtor, is a source of comfort to me.

Additionally, Mr. Shore's clients represent entities that have significant economic stakes in these proceedings, presumably through acquired claims but that doesn't matter, and they have an interest in maximizing value and preserving rights. In effect, these natural economic forces that are operating within the case provide some additional comfort in assessing the reasonableness of the business judgment that is being exercised by the debtors.

The only real live objection at this point is Mr.

Kuntz's objection, which is an objection more to the use of cash as opposed to other kinds of consideration or collateral or assets that might be offered up to make the regulators happy. With respect to that position, I believe that the

debtors, the creditors' committee and those who are closely monitoring this process for the banks themselves have done all that they can reasonably do to try to satisfy a difficult situation. Everybody involved has recognized that this is difficult in part because we're dealing with regulators who are not here in court, and I find that a little troublesome but I can't force them to appear. It would be much more comforting to me if I were being asked to approve something and I knew that at the time of approval that a deal was going to be inked and executed promptly thereafter. Instead, this is a little bit of a black box. And it is really that aspect, as opposed to Mr. Kuntz's objections, that I find most troublesome.

Notwithstanding that, I accept the business judgment of the debtors as validated by the creditor constituencies that have been monitoring this, and I approve the motion as presented, both as to Aurora and Woodlands.

MR. PEREZ: Thank you, Your Honor. We are going to need to change one of the orders to reflect the comments from the U.S. Trustee. So we will submit that order later on today after we get back to the office.

THE COURT: That's fine.

If there are parties who wish to be excused who were involved in the Aurora and Woodlands matters, they can be excused. But we now have the SunCal matter.

(Pause)

Page 94 MR. PEREZ: I meant U.S. Attorney, not U.S. Trustee. 1 I misspoke. 2 3 THE COURT: Fine. (Pause) 4 MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, the next two matters on the 5 6 morning docket are the motion to settle with the SunCal 7 trustee, and then the last matter is just the motion for relief from stay that has been continued, obviously to the extent, depending on the Court's ruling, that motion will be moot, and 9 10 there was no counsel for SunCal. Mr. Smiley, who was here in 11 the courtroom last time, is actually on the phone today. there was no intent ever to go forward with that motion, but it 12 13 was just carried along. Mr. Steinberg is going to take the lead for the 14 debtors with respect to the approval of the 9019 motion. 15 16 THE COURT: Okay. MR. STEINBERG: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Arthur 17 Steinberg from King & Spalding, on behalf of Lehman Commercial 18 19 Paper Inc. in its individual capacity and as the agent for the 2.0 first lien lenders in the SunCal bankruptcy cases. Your Honor, we're here today to -- for approval of a 21 settlement, which has been embodied in an amended term sheet 22 between the SunCal trustee and LCPI as the agent for the first 23

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lien lenders and on behalf of itself. Your Honor had signed an

order to show cause was filed and served in accordance with the service list required.

The motion has engendered four responsive pleadings: one responsive pleading filed by Fidelity National; the second by Gramercy Warehouse, which is the agent for the second lien; the third is LBREP Lakeside SC Master I, LLC, which was the equity owner of the SunCal entity that received a dividend in connection with a 2006 financing; and the last pleading was a pleading filed by the creditors' committee, in support of the approval of the motion.

We filed a reply to the responsive pleadings on September 20th, which included the declaration of Robert Brusco, and we also amended the proposed order to try to deal with some of the objections, and we filed two such amendments, the first filed in conjunction with the reply, the second filed last night when we had gotten a comment from the SunCal trustee who said, based on the timing of when he will get his order approving him entering into the settlement, that it'll probably span beyond the two-year statute of limitations for the SunCal trustee to bring avoiding-power claims, and asked to have this order include a provision that allows LCPI to toll the statute of limitations with respect to any action so that he wouldn't be forced to deal with that issue as to how to preserve his claims until the settlement is approved by both this Court and the bankruptcy court.

Your Honor, yesterday the SunCal trustee, who had been struggling trying to get a hearing date from his judge, filed the motion to approve the settlement. The hearing date has been scheduled for December 21. And he was also able to obtain a hearing date of December 2nd for approval of the disclosure statement, so that he is subject to Your Honor approving the New York aspect of this settlement. He is going to try not to lose too much time, prepare a disclosure statement over the month of October so that the adequacy of that disclosure statement can be heard by the judge on December 2nd. Hopefully the judge will approve the settlement at the end of December, confirmation will take place in the early parts of 2011, and we will be able to move forward on the plan.

Your Honor, I think -- in assessing the settlement, I think there are four basic tenets that, once accepted, the approval of the settlement will flow directly from that. The first is that there's no bona fide creditor of LCPI that has objected to the settlement. Two, even the responding parties do not contend that the settlement is unfair from LCPI's perspective. Third, the settlement does not seek to adversely modify any rights except the signatories to the term sheet. In other words, this is a settlement between the SunCal trustee on behalf of the SunCal estate, and LCPI on behalf of itself and the first lien lenders. Fourth, that this settlement was approached with the interest of the LCPI estate. That was the

basis upon which LCPI went forward and entered into the settlement.

With those four tenets accepted, the two general questions that arise in the context of a settlement: Is this settlement in the best interest of the LCPI estate? And are there any third-party rights that are being adversely modified by the settlement? I think the answers flow to those questions from those four basic tenets.

The reason why LCPI decided that this was a critical juncture in this case and it was important to try to settle as compared to further litigate these matters is viewed -- when looked at, the pending litigations that already have been involved for the almost two years that the SunCal cases have been going on. Your Honor was the recipient of the motion to lift the stay that was filed by the SunCal trustee, that was filed earlier this year, asking for permission to sell the properties which is the subject of LCPI's collateral and the first lien lenders' collateral. Companion with that was the motion filed in the SunCal case to retain a broker, which LCPI did not feel was the appropriate broker. Companion with that was a contract that he had entered into for the sale of the properties for forty-one million dollars, which was embedded with a breakup fee of a million dollars, which LCPI didn't agree with. Embedded in that was the request to strip the first lien lenders of their rights to credit-bid, which LCPI

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wasn't in favor of. And embedded with that was an attached draft equitable subordination fraudulent transfer complaint, which they wanted to be able to bring for purposes of determining liability. So that was one critical juncture that we had to decide whether we will face the litigation head-on, whether we would use this opportunity to try to settle.

The second thing is that in the SunCal cases there have been pending disputes that have lasted over the 2010 year with regard to use of cash collateral. Since the filing of the SunCal cases, there's been approximately 4.8 million dollars of cash collateral that is being used for purposes of preserving the properties. It seemed like that, if we didn't do something, that that cash collateral, which would otherwise be the first lien lenders' collateral, would be dissipated further and further. The case started with about a little over eighteen million dollars of cash collateral and now it's been reduced to somewhere between thirteen and fourteen million dollars. So there was a desire to preserve the cash collateral and to sell the properties or to put it into an appropriate position to sell to preserve as much of the cash collateral.

The first lien lenders, in 2008, had filed a motion in the SunCal case to lift the automatic stay. That was basically taken -- put in suspense while the settlement negotiations were going on. But if this case was not going to settle, that motion would be resumed. That motion subsumed lifting --

modifying the stay on two grounds: One ground was lack of adequate protection, but the second ground was that the debtor had no equity in the properties, which I think has been admitted, and that the properties are not necessary for an effective reorganization. No doubt that the pursuit of that automatic-stay litigation would lead to competing plans and further litigation expense. And this case has become more complicated, because it's not all concentrated before one bankruptcy court; it spans two bankruptcy courts, with both bankruptcy courts represented by -- with fiduciaries in both bankruptcy courts trying to advocate the positions on behalf of the estates that they're to represent.

So this was a critical juncture in this case, and we are approaching the two-year anniversary for purposes of bringing avoiding-power claims in the SunCal case. And if we hadn't agreed to toll -- tolling is just a Band-Aid.

Ultimately you have to address the merits of the claims or not.

From the beginning of the case, or very shortly after the beginning, the decision had been made by LCPI to try to get a settlement. And I think Your Honor is familiar with the fact that there was an extensive period of time that had been engaged in to try to negotiate what our papers call the original term sheet. After the trustee -- the SunCal trustee had filed a motion in the California court, it had engendered some objections. The SunCal trustee reviewed his -- the

original term sheet; was concerned as to the ramifications if there were senior liens that were not otherwise covered by title insurance that were greater than a million and a half dollars; did not like necessarily what those ramifications are. He said there was an ambiguity; case got off track; and that precipitated the SunCal trustee motion, the hearing before Your Honor, where Your Honor urged the parties to settle, which brings us to here today.

From LCPI's perspective, the benefits of a settlement are clear. With a settlement, there's a obviously a reduction of the expenses that have been incurred on behalf of the first lien lenders in the case, because you're resolving a significant amount of the litigation that I've outlined before, and you are exchanging general releases. You are avoiding the litigation risk that's involved in any type of case that's before.

And just as significantly, this litigation has created a stalemate in the disposition of not just the cash collateral account but the real-estate property itself because until some of these issues are resolved the property just sits. The property then subsumes a further negative connotation in the market. And most importantly, if there was a realization opportunity, a favorable realization opportunity for the properties, you could potentially lose it as you engage in further protracted litigation as both parties try to gain the

system, leverage each other in order to try to drive to a resolution that they otherwise would have.

So the settlement that has been entered into basically gives two bundles of rights to the LCPI estate in two different time periods: one is the settlement effective date and the second is in conjunction with a plan of reorganization. On the settlement effective date, which is when Your Honor will have approved, if Your Honor approves the settlement, and the SunCal trustee bankruptcy court approves the settlement, at that time the cash collateral account will effectively been allocated in accordance with the term sheet where leases will have been exchanged and litigation will have stopped. Those things will have been put in place. The claims of LCPI in the SunCal case will have been recognized and the claim that the SunCal trustee filed in the LCPI case will have been withdrawn. All of those things take place as of the settlement effective date. under the plan of reorganization the properties will be sold, and the trustee is contractually obligated to proffer a plan which will provide for the sale of the properties for the other assets of this estate to essentially be divided fifty percent to the first-lien lenders, which includes LCPI, and fifty percent to, in effect, the trade creditors. That contemplates the enforcement of the intercreditor subordination agreement between the first-lien lenders and the second and third-lien lenders.

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In this case the first-lien debt is about 235 million dollars; the second-lien debt is 85 million dollars; the third-lien debt is 75 million dollars. The total lien debt in this case is 395 million dollars. The overall claims in this case is about another 60 million or 455 million dollars. The lender group is the predominant class in the SunCal case. A give-up of what otherwise would be given to the first-lien lenders by enforcement of the subordination to get to the fifty-fifty level is a give-up.

The settlement also contemplates what might happen if we could not enforce the intercreditor agreement, if the second-lien lenders or the third-lien lenders could effectively make an argument. They will have that opportunity to make that argument in the context of the SunCal plan of reorganization. If that happens, the settlement provides that LCPI, who is a -about a twelve million dollar holder in the second-lien debt and almost fifty million dollars in the third-lien debt, and the first-lien lenders who hold 235 million dollars, will dedicate their claims back to the trustee in order to effectuate the same fifty-fifty split. Those issues will be resolved as part of the SunCal plan. But either way you work it, because of the mathematics and the size of the first-lien debt and the LCPI positions in the second and the third-lien debt we'll be able to effectuate the fifty-fifty split that's contemplated by the other recoveries.

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So Your Honor, just to highlight the benefits of the settlement -- and I know I've said it before but I just want to emphasize again -- it's the ability to realize the full value of the properties, when we think it should be sold, with the broker that we think it should be sold.

We've agreed to be the stalking-horse bidder, at a minimum, or to say that if the SunCal trustee needs us we will be the stalking-horse bidder at forty-five million dollars which is four million dollars than the bid that he otherwise had before. We agreed to an allocation of the monies that are being used for cash collateral. That allocation is essentially to give the SunCal trustee three and a half million dollars.

Plus agree we're no longer fighting about cash collateral. You have a dedicated fund of another two million dollars to take you through the set -- from the settlement effective date to the disposition of the real estate. If there's any money left over that flows back to the first-lien lenders. The burn rate of cash collateral in this case has been a little over two million dollars a year. It's anticipated that we will not have another year gap for the sale so there will be some money flowing back.

The three and a half million dollars which is being given to the SunCal trustee is necessary because we're selling the real estate through a plan. The reason why we're selling the real estate through a plan instead of a 363 sale is that

the SunCal case is in the Ninth Circuit. The Clear Channel decision has created some difficulties with buyers looking at whether they can get something free and clear, and the decision was made that in order to have the best type of result for marketing the property we do it through a plan.

One of the byproducts of doing it through the plan is that the SunCal trustee needs enough money to pay administrative expenses. As a practical matter, he has not really gotten very -- he hasn't really gotten paid. Creditors' committee counsel really hasn't gotten paid in the two years of this case. There's a loan that Gramercy made, which is the second-lien agent, at the beginning of this case which would have to be paid. There's plan disclosure statements, sale expenses, objections to claims expenses, assisting us on the resolution of the senior lien issue; all of those are administrative expenses.

I don't think there's a lot of fat left over for anything, but it was necessary to give that sum of money, and that sum of money is a half a million dollars more than the original term sheet. It was deemed, because he may have to deal with the broker who won't have the same deal that he thought he had, that he may have to deal with the contractual bidder that has never been approved, that he may have to deal with something like that. We gave him the money so that he could administer the case and confirm a plan pursuant to which

the real estate, which is the primary collateral, would be sold.

Those are our benefits. The detriments that we gave up are we gave up some of our cash collateral. But we have been fighting cash collateral for two years already in this case. We've already had a 4.8 million dollar dissipation of cash collateral. We gave up 3.5 percent of the net proceeds that we would get under the real estate.

Now, we said we would be a stalking-horse bidder for forty-five million dollars. There are potentially senior mechanics' liens which would be ahead of us. To do simple math, if the net purchase price would be fifty million dollars because we were able to get a deal that reflected that amount of money net to us, net of the brokerage fee and everything else, 3.5 percent would be 1.75 million dollars to the SunCal estate and 48.25 million dollars for the benefit of the first-lien lenders. In the context of a compromise that was deemed to be sufficient from LCPI's perspective. And I think no one is challenging that LCPI is having at least a fair deal in the matter.

There are the three responsive pleadings, other than the committee that is supportive of the transaction. One was filed by Fidelity, and I think that's probably the easiest to deal with because Fidelity perceived an ambiguity which we, frankly, didn't think existed. But for purposes of clarifying

the record, and we put it in our reply, that when we said that the SunCal trustee was going to cooperate in trying to deal with the senior lien issue that was not meant to say that the first-lien lenders, who in effect purchased the title policy, would not live within its contractual commitments for cooperation. The bargained-for rights for the SunCal trustee was additive. So it was not only that the first-lien lenders will do something but if it didn't cost an extreme amount of money the SunCal trustee would also cooperate to allow us to resolve the mechanics' lien issues which are the creditors of the SunCal estate.

So we clarified that. I make the statement on the record. With that statement, I think, we've spoken to them before, I think they're here today, everything else they said in their pleading was a reservation of rights, the same type of reservations of rights that they sent to the first-lien lenders over a year ago, to the counsel that was handling mechanics' liens issues saying that there are some potential defenses we have, we'll defend you, we'll stand -- we'll continue to defend you now, but we're reserving our rights because we haven't crossed the bridge on that yet.

And they said please, Your Honor, although we're saying to you, sir, as we're reserving our rights, we're not asking you to rule on any of those reservations of rights in connection with the settlement agreement. And generally we are

supportive of the settlement, it cleans up most of the objections, and subject to cleaning up the ambiguity that I referred to before we're generally supportive of the settlement agreement.

So I was careful to call them responsive pleadings instead of an objection because I didn't want to overstate what Fidelity had. They, like a lot of title insurance companies, they put their marker down saying I'm still holding on to my bundle of rights, rights which we totally disagree with and we think at the end of the day we will win, but there's no reason to deal with that in the context of this motion because they're not asking you to, I don't think we have to, and it's not an impediment to the settlement.

THE COURT: Let me stop you for a second. You've been talking for quite awhile, Mr. Steinberg. Is the Fidelity objection a live objection at this point?

MR. COHEN: Good afternoon --

THE COURT: If you say no that'd be great.

MR. COHEN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Joshua Cohen from Day Pitney, on behalf of Fidelity.

With respect to the issue of the duty to cooperate,

Mr. Steinberg's representations on the record and the

statements that were made in the reply do address those issues

and address the objection that was asserted with respect to

that. So with respect to that issue, Your Honor, the answer is

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no.

We do have reservations of rights that we would like to address on the record, whether Your Honor wishes to do it now or following the rest of the presentations --

THE COURT: Well, we've been going for a long time and we're kind of at a point where we're either going to get this done before I break for lunch, because I have a 2 o'clock calendar, or we're going to carry this to the afternoon calendar. And so I need to get some sense as we go, objection by objection, whether or not I'm going to have what amounts to lengthy argument with respect to the objections or whether or not these are just going to be statements, reservation of rights type objections.

I suspect the fact that both Mr. McKane and Mr. Basta are in court today indicates either they don't have that much to do right now or they're going to be pressing their objections on behalf of LBREP vigorously which suggests to me that I may be taking a lunch break, it's just a question of when. Unless -- there's somebody standing in the gallery --

MR. DURRER: I apologize for rising, Your Honor. I have a suggestion that I think will address Your Honor's direct question about schedule.

THE COURT: What, about lunch?

MR. DURRER: No, Your Honor. It'll actually allow the conclusion of these proceedings instantly.

THE COURT: Okay, let's hear what that might be.

MR. DURRER: Thank you, Your Honor, I appreciate that.

Van Durrer, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom on behalf of

Gramercy Warehouse Funding I, LLC, the second-lien agent, as

Mr. Steinberg mentioned.

Your Honor, I know that the debtors had filed on

Monday a declaration of Mr. Brusco. We have reviewed it. I've

cobbled together a cross-examination of Mr. Brusco which I'm

prepared to go forward with today. But my understanding under

Local Rules is that this would not be an evidentiary hearing.

Given that the SunCal matter in California is set for hearing

on December 21st, it doesn't seem to me that there is any rush,

nothing's going to happen for several months in any event, so

that if we could schedule an evidentiary hearing so that

discovery can be taken, if appropriate, and we can brief any

issues that Your Honor identifies or that the parties think

would be appropriate --

THE COURT: That doesn't sound like an instant resolution at all. That sounds like stretching this out to the detriment of the parties, and I appreciate your stepping up at 12:30 to make that proposal, but you can sit down.

MR. DURRER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We're not doing that. We're going forward and we're taking a lunch break. But I want to take a lunch break at an appropriate time which would be after Mr. Steinberg

has completed his recitation as to the current status of things and parties who are represented who are objectors with live objections can at least state what their intentions are or whether or not they agree with what's been said. And we're then going to resume at 2 o'clock immediately after the 2 o'clock status conference which involves one of the adversary proceedings and shouldn't take terribly long. So I have time this afternoon to hear you.

MR. STEINBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. With respect to Fidelity, they did, in addition to their reservation of rights, say that there were two ambiguities. And one related to if we do a sale free and clear of liens except for permitted liens, as contrasted to senior liens, permitted liens being the kind of things like easements, et cetera, they said that that word is kind of used loosely and we accept their comment and when the sale motion is filed or is embedded in part of the plan we will be careful of how the permitted liens are defined so we don't have a circular type definition.

As far as their saying that they haven't committed to give title insurance to any potential buyer for the property we accept that notion that they haven't committed to give title insurance.

With regard to the objection filed by Gramercy, the second-lien agent, they raised three objections, two of which we've resolved pursuant to the proposed order. One related to

the clause in the proposed order that said that there was a retention of jurisdiction to this court. They were concerned that that type of what I thought a plain vanilla clause could potentially undermine the jurisdiction of the California court. And they asked us to include language that says that nothing is intended to undermine and affect the exclusive jurisdiction of the California court and whatever those issues are or to predetermine any concurrent jurisdiction issues. And we were prepared to live with that language. Obviously, it's Your Honor's order, but we would find that acceptable.

The second was they looked at a page in the amended term sheet, they flipped seven pages later, they said 'Ah-hah, I think there may be another ambiguity. Can you potentially clear it up?' They suggested some language. We accepted that language. The language specifically said that, in essence, that nothing in this term sheet is intended to, in effect, adversely modify the rights of any party who wasn't settling. So we weren't trying to predetermine any rights that the first-lien lenders had as against the second-lien lenders. We were simply settling our disputes between the SunCal estate and the SunCal trustee and LCPI. So we accepted their language and they're fine with that.

So then the third thing is really not an objection, and they really do not have standing for anything in this case. They are not a creditor of LCPI. They are a creditor of the

SunCal estate which is a disputed creditor of the LCPI estate. Their argument -- and it's not even an objection because they say basically, 'Judge, we're trying to be helpful here' -- sort of like the same kind of help that they had about the adjournment -- 'We're trying to be helpful here. What we think is that the SunCal trustee hasn't done his job. He hasn't done his diligence. Man, if he did more diligence he'd be able to find bigger claims against the LCPI estate. He'll never win in the SunCal court, so let's assume he's not going to win and let's deal with that issue automatically right now. Let's lift the stay, let the SunCal trustee take more discovery on the claims that he's otherwise settling or let's appoint another examiner in this case. Let's have the LCPI estate bear greater administrative expenses as a helpful suggestion by a noncreditor of the LCPI estate, all for the purpose of establishing larger claims against LCPI and undermining the settlement.'

Well, I think that argument is probably a very good argument in support of the settlement because he's essentially conceded, without being a party-in-interest in this case, that this is a good settlement for LCPI. And that is what we're asking Your Honor to evaluate. But certainly I don't think he has standing to object. Once we said that there's nothing in this case that's affecting his rights then we don't think that he has standing to say anything in this case at all.

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And I think, just to put it on the table, he's being helpful because he is a party, his client is a party to an intercreditor agreement that says that "The second-lien agent will not contest or support any person in contesting in any proceeding the priority, validity or enforceability of a lien held by the first-lien lender claim holders in their first-lien collateral." So he's skating very close to it, and so as a nonparty to this action he's coming forward with this type of helpful suggestion.

With regard to LBREP Lakeside, they are not asserting that this settlement is unfair to the creditors of LCPI. They are not criticizing LCPI's decision to settle claims asserted by the SunCal trustee. In reality, their only complaint is that they're not getting a settlement as well too; they want a settlement. It would be nice if they settled but there is no settlement on the table right now. They value their claim at zero. The SunCal trustee values their claim as something more than zero. They haven't been able to bridge the gap.

But there's nothing in this settlement that prevents

LBREP from settling with the SunCal trustee. There's nothing

at all that affects their rights. They could do it tomorrow.

They could do it next week. They could do it before December.

We can't force the SunCal trustee to settle with LBREP.

Certainly we can't force it to settle it at a zero number. And there's nothing in the amended term sheet that is preventing

them from settling.

They've conjured up a whole bunch of arguments, none of which are grounded in any type of law. Since we say that there's nothing in this settlement that's affecting any of LBREP's rights they still somehow say that based on some law which isn't apposite that we are profiting from our wrongdoing because we're settling on the loans that we made while they're still exposed on the dividend recap. The cases that they cite all relate to one party directly suing another party.

THE COURT: I read the footnote that included some of the very interesting cases that were cited --

MR. STEINBERG: Okay, so --

THE COURT: -- involving photographs and real contests and the like.

MR. STEINBERG: So the general obligation law citation which is really just a bootstrap of the same argument that you shouldn't be able to profit from the other: (a) we don't have a litigation; (b) we're not asserting contribution claims; and (c) even if we had -- if we were joint tortfeasors and we were asserting contribution claims they get the benefit of the reduction of their liability under New York general obligations law.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STEINBERG: You heard that part. All right, so then I'll leave with the last two arguments that they have.

THE COURT: I actually read the papers.

MR. STEINBERG: Okay. So then I'll just -- Your

Honor, just the last two things, and maybe I'll just flag them

and if Your Honor has any questions, because I think our papers

adequately dealt with them. One was if we settle, after having

staked out all of our position in the SunCal estate, if we

settle and say that we never believed that this litigation had

any merit but we suddenly change our position because we are a

potential recipient of the other recoveries, will we perjure

ourselves, violate the federal rules based on this concern.

And I think that is clearly a nonmeritorious objection, and our

papers recite why we would uphold the oath, the ability to tell

the truth, et cetera, et cetera.

And the last thing that they say is that there's a conflict of interest. And really the biggest example of why there's no conflict of interest is they're in court today.

Right? They're objecting to the settlement. We're not controlling them. We didn't undermine any aspect of their settlement. We didn't try to affect their ability to settle at all. They are -- you know, the LBREP or the Lehman estate entity is a minority economic interest in LBREP. It's -- the majority or the clear majority is held by third parties. In the LCPI, for the first-lien lenders the LCPI estate is only thirty percent of the first-lien lender debt. There are all these outside third parties that are making sure that their

individual parochial rights are being protected. There is nothing in here as a bottom line that's prejudice. And we said it at the beginning and the basic tenet is that we approach this settlement from the perspective of LCPI. We didn't approach it from the perspective of LBREP. We did it on behalf of LCPI who is the individual lender and is acting as an agent for the first-lien lenders.

Your Honor, our papers do recite the general standards that I know you're familiar with about lowest range of reasonableness, canvassing of the issues, et cetera, and we think we've clearly met that burden in this case.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

I want to hear, before I hear from LBREP Lakeside, from Mr. Smiley if he's on the line.

Mr. Smiley, are you there?

MR. SMILEY: Yes, I am, Your Honor. Good afternoon. Your Honor, I don't have much to add on behalf of the SunCal Chapter 11 Trustee. I just would point out that this settlement is supported by both the Chapter 11 Trustee of the SunCal estates, by the creditors' committee in our estates, obviously by the debtor in your estates and the creditors' committee in your estates. And --

THE COURT: That's helpful. Let me ask you one question because counsel for Gramercy made another one of his helpful suggestions in proposing that maybe we could just end

this whole thing, go to lunch, and do this another day. And I told him that I thought that wasn't a good idea and I proposed that he take his seat again. I see him smiling, at least, in the courtroom right now.

One of the reasons that I made that judgment -- I want to verify this with you -- is that my conclusion from what Mr. Steinberg said about the scheduling of this in California is that things need to move forward on the assumption that you have a settlement that's at least approved here, and that in order for you to be undertaking the work necessary for plan disclosure statement purposes you really need to have that certainty, and that delay here would lead to delay in California. I want to confirm that that assumption on my part is correct.

MR. SMILEY: Your Honor, your assumption is correct. Although we have a December 21 date before Judge Smith and we did try to get an earlier date, we went ahead and filed our compromise motion almost ninety days early so that if there's discovery, if there's issues that need to be addressed that they can be addressed in our estate. And in addition to that, given that there is a drop dead date of February 28th to confirm a plan, we do need to proceed right away with filing the plan of reorganization, and we anticipate having that filed by probably mid to late October. So timing is an issue.

Another important note is we have a potential

stalking-horse bidder that was proffered in connection with our original motion. They are still there. There are other bidders and they are all -- they all call almost every day. And we need to give them answers about whether we're going down this process or not. A lot of them have put a lot of time and effort into reviewing these trial briefs. THE COURT: Okay. MR. SMILEY: So it is important that we move expeditiously and that we have certainty on both coasts in both cases. THE COURT: All right, thank you for that. Is there anything more you wish to add? 12 MR. SMILEY: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Now before we take a lunch break, unless it's possible to resolve this in the next ten minutes, I want to just find out from counsel for LBREP Lakeside -- is 17 there some easy way to say that? How about just Lakeside? 18 MR. BASTA: Or just LBREP -- or Lakeside's fine. Your Honor, I have about fifteen or twenty minutes of argument. 20 There's no evidence. If they don't go beyond the scope of the declaration there won't be any evidence; fifteen to twenty 21 22 minutes of argument. THE COURT: Okay. And let me find out from Gramercy what Gramercy really wants to do at this point. 25 MR. DURRER: Your Honor, Van Durrer for Gramercy.

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Page 119 Well, as I mentioned, Your Honor, we are prepared to go 1 forward. We will have argument. We will have cross-2 3 examination of the witness. THE COURT: You're perfectly permitted, in my view, 4 given the circumstances, to call the declarant. I assume the 5 declarant is in court? 6 7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes, he is. THE COURT: So his declaration, which I have read, 8 would be his direct testimony and you can ask questions on 9 cross-examination. That suggests that we should take a lunch 10 11 break and I'll see you back at 2 o'clock. We're adjourned till then. 12 (Recess from 12:42 p.m. until 2:24 p.m.) 13 THE COURT: Be seated, please. We'll start with the 14 15 pre-trial. Do we have counsel for Michigan State Housing? 16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor, they're just conferring in the hallway so my colleague just went to ask them 17 to come in. 18 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 (Pause) MR. ALBANESE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 22 MR. ALBANESE: Anthony Albanese on behalf of the 23 24 debtors in connection with the Michigan State matter. 25 We're here for a conference with the Court.

Honor, the matter -- this adversary proceeding has been stayed a number of times pending the parties' attempt to mediate the dispute. Most recently the stay was in fact up until July 15th. Our adversary, Michigan State, who I'll turn it over to in a moment, had not agreed to extend the stay at that point in time because they wanted to see more movement on the mediation front. The parties had conferred several times in an attempt -- without a formal mediator in an attempt to move the ball forward.

THE COURT: This is a mediation without a mediator?

MR. ALBANESE: Correct. We were --

THE COURT: That's not mediation.

MR. ALBANESE: Well, we now have a mediator. My next point, Your Honor, is that we now have a mediator. They've been appointed. We've been waiting for one to be appointed but we're trying to move the ball forward in the interim. A mediator has now been appointed; we just learned yesterday who the mediator would be. And the mediator has proposed three dates in the end of October and the beginning of November. The debtor is available on all three dates. Michigan is determining which of those dates they're available on.

So the debtors request that the matter, the adversary proceeding, be stayed at least pending the mediation which should occur within thirty days. And Michigan State has not yet agreed to consent to that stay, but I'll turn the floor

over to them. But at this point it does not seem to make sense for the debtors to spend any time and money engaging in discovery the next thirty days in the adversary proceeding not that we do in fact have a mediator and have three proposed dates which the debtors have agreed to all three dates.

THE COURT: Okay. Where's Michigan State? Please identify yourself for the record.

MR. MURPHY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Michael Murphy appearing on behalf of the Michigan State Housing Development Authority.

We just got -- I think it was just last night that some e-mail came through with so-called dates for the mediation. One of our concerns has been, consistently all through this process, is that to mediate this meaningfully to hopefully get a resolution out of mediation we need certain information to be able to have an effective mediation. We've never been able to get that. We've had a couple of informal conferences over the phone. We've had various agreements that have fallen apart over this period of time about exchanging certain information. We did submit significant information to Lehman Brothers based upon how we calculated our termination payments. They said they would simultaneously give us their information. We got two pages from them of just nothing that we could work with or figure out.

So we had another phone conference subsequent to that.

We did make some headway narrowing the issues. But the problem is, is I know the Court wants to, and we've agreed to, and I think it's a very good idea to try to mediate the dispute. But if you can't get information to be able to effectively mediate it then we're wasting everyone's time. So we were trying to get some discovery to get this information and we've conducted most of the criteria in Rule 26 which allows -- you know, we've done certain things as far as exchanging and swapping information. We've prepared a discovery plan. We have submitted it to them. We're waiting for comments. To stay the matter thirty days and then go to mediation without information that we think we need to effectively mediate it means we're going to spend a whole day at the mediation and not be able to accomplish much. So that's why we haven't agreed to the stay.

THE COURT: Well, whether you agree to it or not, there isn't going to be a lot of activity in the litigation unrelated to preparing for the mediation if you're both agreeing to mediate. So I think it's largely an academic issue.

Also, I looked at the pleadings here, and if I understand correctly what's going on, you're seeking to recover a 2.4 million dollar, more or less, payment that was made to Lehman allegedly by your trustee that shouldn't have been made. But your trustee isn't a defendant. Why is that?

MR. MURPHY: There's been some discussion with our

clients as regarding their relationship with the trustee and the bonding thing and they don't feel that the trustee should be brought in at this time as a defendant, and so I've honored their wishes.

THE COURT: I consider that curious, to say the least.

If the payment was allegedly made improperly by the trustee you may not have all the parties before the Court or before the mediation who may have potential financial responsibility.

Also, I see that there is a counter-claim, although it's unclear to me from the counter-claim what the damages might be based upon your calculation of termination payments.

And I would hope that at least the parties would exchange that much information so you know what your exposure is in this case just in case you might be on the wrong end of it.

Do you know what your exposure is in this case?

MR. MURPHY: Yes, we do, based upon the ADR submittals that Lehman Brothers have already made.

THE COURT: Then you probably know what you need to know.

MR. MURPHY: Yes, at least we have a pretty good idea.

THE COURT: Okay. What do the parties want from me at this conference?

MR. ALBANESE: Your Honor, I would suggest that we set a conference for after the mediation which will occur about November 5th. And hopefully we'll resolve it, we'll continue

Page 124 our discussions before and during the mediation, and if not 1 2 then we'll come before Your Honor with a discovery schedule. THE COURT: Fine, that makes sense. 3 MR. ALBANESE: Thank you, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: And to the extent that there is a need for 5 some informal information in order to make the mediation 6 7 productive, I assume that the parties will cooperate with one another in providing the information necessary to make the 9 mediation a productive experience for all parties. MR. ALBANESE: We will, Your Honor. And our last 10 11 call, I think we agreed was our most productive, so we'll continue in that -- down that path. 12 13 THE COURT: Good. You're moving in the right 14 direction. Okay. 15 MR. ALBANESE: Thank you, Your Honor. 16 MR. MURPHY: Thank you. THE COURT: Now we'll pick up with LBREP. 17 (Pause) 18 19 THE COURT: Was any progress made during the lunch 2.0 break? MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, I think at this point in 21 time you had indicated you wanted to hear from the objectors. 22 With regard to the second-lien agent, Gramercy, we had 23 24 indicated that we had questioned whether they had any standing 25 to -- at this point in time. Even if Your Honor was prepared

to hear them out for the completeness of a record, I'm not sure what is left of their objection because if Your Honor -- and I think at the morning hearing didn't accept their helpful suggestions then I think we resolved those aspects that they objected to and I don't think they have anything left in their objection that they've filed that they're objecting to the settlement, and they are the only person asking to examine a witness. So before we hear from the objectors it would be helpful to figure out what is it that the second-lien agent is objecting to at this point in time.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm prepared to hear from them what it is that they're objecting to --

MR. STEINBERG: Thank you.

THE COURT: -- at this time and also to hear on what basis they claim to have standing to object in the first instance.

MR. STEINBERG: Thank you, Judge.

MR. DURRER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Van Durrer, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, on behalf of Gramercy Warehouse Funding I, LLC.

With regard to our standing, Your Honor, I think that the answer is pretty simple. Mr. Steinberg has already mentioned, and it's not disputed, that Gramercy as second-lien agent and LCPI as first-lien agent, among others, are parties to an intercreditor agreement that was entered into early in

Page 126 2007 that governs the rights and obligations and duties among 1 2 the parties. THE COURT: Do you have any claims in the LCPI case? 3 MR. DURRER: We do, Your Honor. 4 5 THE COURT: What are they? MR. DURRER: The claims would be for breach of that 6 7 agreement and/or for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing that arises under that agreement under New York law and also California law by entering into the settlement. 9 THE COURT: Did you file a protective proof of claim 10 11 to cover those claims? MR. DURRER: We did not file a protective proof of 12 claim, Your Honor, because under the Ninth Circuit law those 13 actions, because they arise -- well, first of all, we didn't 14 15 file one under the intercreditor agreement because this issue 16 hadn't arisen. With regard to the underlying actions, which is --17 THE COURT: Do you claim that this settlement 18 19 agreement violates the intercreditor agreement? 20 MR. DURRER: I may, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, but -- well, you may; do you? 21 MR. DURRER: I've not yet had an opportunity to 22 examine the witness or depose the witness. I just got the 23 24 declaration for the first time a couple of days ago and there 25 are issues that arise in that declaration that give me pause

regarding the good faith nature of this negotiation and the entering into the settlement by LCPI.

The other claims that we have, independent from the intercreditor agreement, are the same claims that are being released by the settlement. The reason why we didn't file a proof of claim with respect to those, Your Honor, is that under Ninth Circuit law when the order for relief was entered and the trustee was appointed we were divested of those claims, they were taken over by the SunCal trustee, and it would have been a stay violation for me -- in that case for me to file a proof of claim in this case and assert dominion and control over those causes of action.

THE COURT: It sounds to me that you don't have any claims. You've just said that those claims were divested and became claims of the trustee under Ninth Circuit law, so haven't you just said you don't have standing?

MR. DURRER: No, Your Honor, because we still have -first of all, standing is broader than having a claim, in the
first instance. Standing as a creditor is also broader than
having filed a proof of claim. The settlement, I believe,
based upon what I've heard so far, and I want to test it by
asking the witness some questions, I believe may negatively
impact our rights under the intercreditor agreement.

And I mean, there's no doubt that we are a party to an agreement with this debtor. I think that under 1109, if not as

a claim today, that clearly gives us standing to ask questions about a settlement that hinges upon the operation of the intercreditor agreement itself.

And the fifty-fifty split, Your Honor, that is a component of the settlement, it requires that LCPI and the SunCal trustee win an argument against me that I'm not entitled to proceeds of certain recoveries by virtue of that agreement.

And I believe that entering into that agreement without even consulting with us at all as a party-in-interest potentially violated their duty of good faith and fair dealing. I think that that --

THE COURT: Which bankruptcy court would be the right court to decide whether or not you have a claim?

MR. DURRER: Apparently, Your Honor, I think it's a question of concurrent jurisdiction. I think that either court may have jurisdiction to hear that. Honestly I haven't explored it in depth and research. But this is the problem that we're here for, as a matter of fact, if I can address that for a moment.

Mr. Steinberg actually used a very appropriate metaphor earlier; he called this a stalemate, and it is. The problem is Judge Smith in California has not let LCPI exercise its remedies against its collateral because of the allegations that have been made in the California court. However, this Court has not permitted anyone to take discovery -- and I'm not

saying that Your Honor personally took an interest or invoked some sort of control, but rather the debtor has invoked the automatic-stay protection of this Court to prevent any party-in-interest from taking any discovery, not even in their motion for stay relief. They go into California court and they say 'I'd like stay relief. I would like relief from this court, yet you cannot ask me any questions, you cannot depose my people, you cannot see my documents.' That creates the stalemate.

So we -- and I must admit that when Mr. Steinberg describes my suggestions they don't sound as helpful as I thought they were, but out of my own mouth, I mean, we thought that let's raise our hand now and say to Your Honor, you know, we have a couple of suggestions as to how to break that stalemate and let this thing move forward. One suggestion was lifting the automatic stay just for discovery, just for discovery purposes. And we can certainly work with the other side to delineate how that process goes. Perhaps we can engage in it informally. So far we've been completely rebut --

THE COURT: What's your objection to the settlement agreement, apart from these suggestions of what you want to do or what relief you're seeking unrelated to the settlement agreement? What is Gramercy's objection to the settlement agreement that hasn't already been covered by adjustments made in the order?

MR. DURRER: The objection we have to the settlement at this point, Your Honor, based on the declaration filed a couple of days ago, is that the settlement is not fair, even to this estate, because it may expose the estate to substantial administrative liabilities, and that it is not --THE COURT: When you say "this estate", you're talking about the estate of LCPI? MR. DURRER: Correct, Your Honor. And that is --THE COURT: So you're here as a friend of the LCPI creditors? MR. DURRER: No, I would rather not have to pursue litigation to recover a forty million dollar administrative claim in this estate. I'd rather not be here, Your Honor, candidly, but for the fact that it's very close to California weather here today, I would rather not, you know, dart in your doorway. But our objection to the settlement is that, and that the settlement has not been entered into in good faith. THE COURT: All right. I'll hear what you have to say, why it's time for you to examine the witness, if you choose to do that. MR. DURRER: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Now, is there any question as to your standing, Mr. Basta? MR. BASTA: Your Honor, there is none. We filed proof of claim 28846 in the LCPI case as a --

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THE COURT: Well, welcome to our court.

MR. BASTA: Okay, thank you. It's been a year since I've been here and I'm glad to be back.

THE COURT: Has it been that long? It hardly seems that long.

MR. BASTA: Yes. We filed a proof of claim and that's going to be the heart of my argument today because the proof of claim is a protective proof of claim for contribution from LCPI if it turns out that our client, LBREP Lakeside, is liable on a fraudulent conveyance action. We filed a protective proof of claim to make sure that the comparable recoveries are smoothed out.

Let me just start out, Your Honor -- we have a lot of respect for the folks on the other side. In fact, we work with them all the time. And the reason we work with them all the time is that we are a partnership. And our general partner is controlled by the Lehman estate. And the Lehman estate is our largest constituent. And when the dividend came out, it's the Lehman entities that got the largest share of that dividend. And when we want to make a major decision, we call up to one of Alfredo's partners, we say, hey, look, we've got to make this major decision. And he says, okay, we'll go, we'll speak to the people in the Lehman estate. And the Lehman estate sort of says, you can do this and you can do that. And we work it out. So everything goes pretty smoothly. Sometimes.

Here, we've been trying to get in the door on the settlement discussions. We're not naïve. I'm not here saying that LCPI has a duty to bring me in to the settlement. can settle whatever they want. I've been on the other side. I've been in multi-debtor cases. I'm not saying that the interest of LCPI and the interest of LBREP cannot be adverse to one another. That's not the position I'm taking. And it's not the position that I'm taking that this is a bad settlement for I haven't looked at it from that perspective. looked at it under Drexel and a RICO which is, does the settlement adversely affect our client which is LBREP. the focus of our objection. And our position is that based on the structure of the settlement, our contribution claims against LPCI (sic) are being eliminated under state law while they are preserving under their settlement through the structure their contribution claims against us.

And let me walk the Court through why this problem exists. And before I do that, you know what the settlement is, Your Honor. Mr. Steinberg laid it out. There's a fifty-fifty split on -- they get fifty percent of the proceeds from the litigation against my client, LBREP Lakeside, on the dividend recap. They get fifty percent direct interest. So if the trustee wins in the fraudulent conveyance claim against us, LCPI and the other lenders, these -- LCPI structured the deal, sized the debt, syndicated the loan, sold the loan with the

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purpose of it being a dividend. They get fifty percent of the recovery against us.

The term sheet says they get a fifty percent recovery in other recoveries. It's misleading, Your Honor. There's two assets of this estate. There's the real estate which is being sold and they've reduced their secured claim to forty-five million dollars so that they can get somebody to come in and bid. And there's a lawsuit against us. And it's not in -- of the recovery because it's not a different lawsuit. It's not a different set of facts. There's one set of facts. There's a dividend recap. They sued LCPI and they sued the lenders. they've threatened to sue us and they haven't done it yet but they've shown us the draft of the complaint. It's the same allegations. It's the cause of action. It's just -- there's nothing different about it. They're just getting released. They're taking a fifty percent interest in the lawsuit against us.

Now, I know Your Honor made the comment about those cases that we cited. But what I would like to do --

THE COURT: I was particularly interested in the case involving the photographs.

MR. BASTA: Oh okay. Your Honor, what I would like to do, because this is basically, I think, one statute is sort of the sum of my argument -- a few additional tweaks.

THE COURT: I don't mind hearing about the case, in

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particular, but it just caught my eye.

MR. BASTA: Okay. And I'm not going to talk about that case.

THE COURT: Good.

MR. BASTA: If I could hand up a copy of New York law for a second?

THE COURT: Sure.

(Pause)

MR. BASTA: So this is a New York statute on joint tortfeasor, what happens if somebody gets released. And I don't think anyone can argue that Lehman isn't subject to applicable nonbankruptcy law. Now what this says is what is the effect of a release of a tort type claim against LCPI. And so the first question is, is this really a tort. Are we under this statute -- am I looking in the right place. And we've cited cases, both Morgenthau and a California case, Ryan, for the proposition that a fraudulent conveyance action is a tort claim.

And there's three sections. So Section A says that if they settle with the SunCal trustee, our liability is reduced by the amount of their settlement. And Mr. Steinberg referenced that in his opening remarks. And I'm sure the SunCal trustee and LBREP at the appropriate time are going to have a rigmarole about how much our liability is reduced by the fact that a joint defendant settled.

08-13555-mg Doc 12227 Filed 09/24/10 Entered 10/21/10 12:24:14 Main Document Pg 135 of 176, et al., LB1 Page 135 Now look at Section B. This is absolutely critical. 1 2 If Your Honor approves this settlement, our proof of claim for contribution against LCPI is barred by B because a settlement I 3 am prohibited from seeking contribution against LCPI if the 4 5 settlement is approved. Done. My proof of claim is gone. And 6 then there is what is known as the quid pro quo. 7 THE COURT: Your proof of claim isn't gone. It's just that there's an affirmative defense to that claim that 8 presented --9 MR. BASTA: There's affirmative -- well, yes. Your 10 11 Honor --THE COURT: -- that presented a result in an objection 12 to the claim which is contingent anyway. 13 MR. BASTA: Yes. But, Your Honor, the key there is 14 that in order for them --15 16 THE COURT: Because we disallowed his contingent in 17 any event. MR. BASTA: Your Honor -- well, it depends what the 18 19 facts are at the time -- just because it's contingent it would 2.0 have to --THE COURT: I'm not challenging the argument that 21 you're making. 22

- MR. BASTA: Yes. 23
- 24 THE COURT: It's just that you -- I think you may have

25 stated --

Page 136 MR. BASTA: I short-circuited --1 2 THE COURT: -- a little more strongly than was 3 necessary. MR. BASTA: That's a fair statement. I apologize for 5 doing that. It's not that --6 THE COURT: It doesn't -- your claim doesn't just 7 disappear. MR. BASTA: It doesn't disappear. But, Your Honor, 9 it's subject to them coming in -- when we can addressed in the proof of claim process, it's subject to them coming in and 10 11 relying on 15-108(b) and saying that no matter what happens, we're not entitled to prosecute that claim against the estate. 12 13 And the guid pro guo for this section is subsection (c) because if I'm prohibited from seeking contribution against 14 15 them, they're prohibited from seeking contribution against us. 16 And that is the heart of it which is that what they are doing -- this is one lawsuit, one cause of action -- maybe 17 18 multiple causes of action but the same set of facts. They are 19 entering into a settlement. They are borrowing LBREP's 20 rights -- they could borrow LBREP's rights to pursue them for contribution if they're taking the fifty percent interest in 21 22 the lawsuit against us. And this rule is not unique to New York. This is the rule in twenty-five states and in 23 24 California, this is also the rule. It's -- I can get Your 25 Honor the citation but it's the same rule in California.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this.

MR. BASTA: Yeah.

THE COURT: I don't want to get into what the rule is in California. But is it your position that New York general obligations law applies to a litigation which has not yet been commenced in California with respect to real property to be developed in California and loans that were entered into in connection with that real property in California?

MR. BASTA: Your Honor, there is a choice of law question. I think that our proof of claim which it has an effect on is obviously subject to New York law. I think you could apply California law, candidly, because -- you could apply California because the property is located in California. But the citation if I could get -- I'll get the citation, Your Honor. I can present to the Court that the rule barring contribution, our contribution claim against the estate once they have settled, that rule is identical in both New York and in California.

And, Your Honor, the -- to answer your question, there's a case, and it's cited in our papers, that says that the prohibition on contribution -- these rules come into effect even with respect to lawsuits that have not yet been filed.

Meaning that, once they settle, that's a prohibition on contribution. There's no requirement that a lawsuit be filed in order to trigger that. And the definition of

contribution -- we cited these state law cases. And one of the reasons we cited these state law cases is that the definition of contribution is very broad because what I think the statute is trying to do is they want settlements, they want LCPI and SunCal to settle so we don't have to hear about this anymore. But -- so you should foster that. But it's not really -- unless you get to the quid pro quo in (b) and (c), it's not really getting rid of the litigation, because what it's going to shift is that instead of them being sued by the SunCal trustee, if there's ultimately a judgment, they're going to end up being sued by us on behalf of figuring out who is more responsible for the underlying claim.

There is an easier way to settle the lawsuit. The way to settle the lawsuit is they compromise their claims with the SunCal trustee and not create an economic interest in the lawsuit against us. And this rule -- you know, we cited a lot of Justice Cardozo, don't profit from your own wrongdoing. The rule is, I think, a basically common sense rule. You can't take advantage of the statute to get a settlement and prohibit us from going against them. You can't take that benefit. Okay?

THE COURT: Well, they cite a whole bunch of cases, too, and say that this has nothing to do with profiting from wrongdoing which is how we get into the photographs and the

25 | Will (ph.) case --

MR. BASTA: Right.

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THE COURT: -- which were cited in that footnote.

And -- I mean, it seems to me -- and I don't mean to make this overly simplistic -- that what you really want is not so much to defeat the settlement as to be benefited by the settlement.

You want -- the affidavit or declaration that was filed by one of your colleagues makes clear in paragraph after paragraph attempts to knock on the door and get into the settlement discussion.

MR. BASTA: Let me explain why that's relevant or not relevant. Mr. Steinberg discussed sort of, like, oh, we can't settle. There's a bid in the ask. There's never been a bid in the ask. But let me -- this is the conflict point. It's not really -- I'm not really alleging a conflict of interest. I'm This is what I'm saying. If you -- we have a bunch of limited partner investors. And let's look at how they view the world. They view the world -- is that LBREP isn't really different than LCPI. We're both subsidiaries of Lehman Brothers. Lehman Brothers is our general partner. Lehman Brothers controls LCPI. And they both owe duties to their constituencies for which they are the controlling party. And on the LCPI side, they're being very vigilant in protecting themselves. They're protecting their economic interest. They're worried about their stakeholders. They enforce the automatic stay when the SunCal trustee came to this Court and

said no, no. The automatic stay applies. You can't come in and you can't affect this entity that we're in control of. But they call us up and they say, wait a minute. They owe those same duties to us. How come -- where is it that they're fighting and saying Lehman has an economic interest in this fund. Lehman has an economic interest in making sure that this lawsuit doesn't deprive the creditors of the Lehman estate with a recovery from this. So we are here. We are the -- we feel like the neglected sibling. We are the sibling that has not been protected by the Lehman estate.

So it's not a conflict. LCPI can do what it wants. They have done a good job. They can settle with their creditors. But what they're doing is something worse than settling with their creditors. They're facilitating a lawsuit, really, that's not meritorious against us and we are under the same common control.

We -- they say something very interesting. And I talked to Mr. Perez about this. They say they don't think
SunCal was insolvent at the time of the dividend. Great. That was a great statement. We don't think it was insolvent either, the fact that they raised the debt. But it's a single issue, solvency. So why are they taking a fifty percent interest in a lawsuit against an entity that they control that they don't think has any merit because SunCal was solvent at the time?
There's only two reasons why that they could be pursuing that.

They're either working with the trustee to try to shake us down for some recovery even though meritoriously they don't think -- because they've said that the company is solvent. They don't think it has any merit. But they want to take a fifty percent cause of action in a lawsuit that they don't think has any merit. We don't think that lives up to 9019. Or, second, and this is really what we think happened, this idea was the SunCal trustee's idea because he said if I can get the lenders in LCPI who orchestrated the transactions on the sideline with an economic interest in the lawsuit, that's going to make my lawsuit against LBREP Lakeside easier. And that's also not a good reason to settle.

So our position is that the settlement agreement is structurally flawed. The provision -- they should go forward with the settlement. God bless them. They should cut out the financial incentive that both prohibits all ability to seek contribution and that results in all of the key evidence being presented by people who have an economic incentive for there to be a finding of a fraudulent conveyance.

Your Honor, there's two other points I'd like to make as I forgot --

THE COURT: Mr. Steinberg was ready to pounce.

MR. BASTA: Just two other points. At the end of the -- Your Honor, the provision of the California code is California Civil Procedure Code 877.6. It has the same

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provision.

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Mr. Perez --

THE COURT: It's just a joint tortfeasor's release provision.

MR. BASTA: Yeah. Mr. Perez' papers at the end make a point about how they offered to us taking the LCPI recovery and putting it into an escrow to accommodate what our concern is. And the papers sort of suggest that we rejected it. We didn't reject it. We don't understand it because, one, what about -we're not just focusing on LCPI. We think all the lenders were participants in this transaction. So just putting into the escrow the LCPI piece doesn't really help us. We don't know what standard is being suggested for the release of the funds from the escrow. So we don't know how that would work. And it seemed to us that what Mr. Perez was suggesting is almost like we're getting a financial interest in a lawsuit against us which we just couldn't figure out. So it's not that we're not open to suggestions on how to structurally address the settlement. We just don't know how that one works in particular.

We also don't think Moore v. Bay is relevant to anything. It's been codified as 544. Moore v. Bay just says it's the trustee who brings the lawsuit. It doesn't say that when the -- a particular creditor who is a joint tortfeasor takes a direct financial pass-through from the trustee that it

gets you out of this joint tortfeasor statute. And there hasn't been any presentation by the debtor as to how any of this works. They don't say -- they don't make a case that this statute is preempted. They don't make a case that the statute doesn't apply. They don't make any case as to what's the impact of our proof of claim. I mean, even if Your Honor's inclined to rule against us, which we hope Your Honor won't, I mean, this is -- what are our rights going forward. Is our ability to go after them for contribution, is that still going to be preserved? We think this whole area and how this whole thing works really needs some clarification to go forward. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, I do have a lot of familiarity with 15-108, having litigated the issue. So I think the first element of clarity --

THE COURT: What issue did you litigate?

MR. STEINBERG: The New York General Obligations Law in other matters. So I'm very familiar with this section. And I know that Mr. Basta just now didn't properly cite the section. And you have to go back to understand that the purpose of 15-108 is to promote settlements. And it does say that if one of joint tort -- one of a number of joint tortfeasors that that joint tortfeasor's contribution claims has against others are dismissed and the contribution claims

that they could otherwise assert against the settling party is What Mr. Basta didn't read is that the other dismissed. protection in 15-108 is that the reduction of the nonsettling parties is reduced by the greater of the consideration paid by the settling party or the proportionate share of fault that the other party had in the transaction, whichever is greater, translated to this situation. If this section applies, which I do not think it applies, and we cited the AMT Mobile case, a Judge Shannon decision, 404 B.R. 118, which specifically said that joint tortfeasor liability doesn't apply in a fraudulent transfer case. And I don't think any of their cases are fraudulent transfer cases. But if this section applied then if LCPI was deemed to be a joint tortfeasor with LBREP and LCPI was fifty percent at fault, and even though they're paying something less than the fifty percent exposure, LBREP's exposure to the SunCal trustee has been reduced by fifty percent because it gets reduced by the greater of the dollars or the equitable share.

THE COURT: So you're saying the settlement benefits them.

MR. STEINBERG: Absolutely benefits them. And the thing that he spent ten minutes railing about is because he didn't fully read the section. The section says you get the benefit of the proportionate fault. That's why the contribution claims go away under this section if this section

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applied. But it doesn't apply because we're not asserting a contribution claim against them. We're asserting a deficiency claim against the SunCal estate. We made a loan on the first lien basis for 235 million dollars. Our collateral would be worth less than a hundred million dollars. We have a deficiency claim for over 200 million dollars. And we're filing it in the case for whatever it comes out to be. And we're actually reducing what our share otherwise would be as an additional benefit to the SunCal trustee to promote the settlement.

So this -- you could try to squeeze as much as you can the square peg into the round hole. But there's no litigation. We haven't asserted any direct claims against them and we're not. We're asserting a claim for a deficiency on a 235 million dollar loan that's filed against them. And let's just put it on the table. The fifty-fifty split, the LCPI share of the fifty-fifty split is fifteen percent, right, with thirty percent of the first lien debt. Our share is fifteen percent. If Gramercy is correct that it doesn't apply to the other recoveries then our share is even going to go down much further than that because the second lienholders and the third lienholders are going to participate in the settlement and we're going to have to contribute more of what the other recoveries are in order to effectuate the fifty-fifty split which is part of this transaction.

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So no one is profiting. They're giving up. And the question asked, why are we giving up -- why are we asking for other recoveries which we think has merit -- well, we agree. We don't think the lawsuit had merit. So at the end of the day, there will be nothing paid by LBREP. They'll win.

They'll vindicate itself. We think they will. And we won't get anything on the other recoveries. And so be it. That's the element of the deal that we captured. And all of this fifty-fifty split is something that's embedded in the plan.

Ultimately, it will have to be approved by the SunCal bankruptcy court in connection with the SunCal plan of reorganization.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question that's very, very basic and follows on your last comment. My approval of this settlement doesn't really effectuate the settlement. It simply is the first step in a process that we discussed on the phone earlier with Mr. Smiley that may lead to a settlement which is a confirmed plan of reorganization which is built on the settlement. Do I understand that correctly?

MR. STEINBERG: Yes and no, Your Honor. There are -if you approve the settlement and the California bankruptcy
court approves the settlement, then we will have a settlement
effective date and certain rights will flow from the settlement
effective date. Then there's a contractual obligation by the
trustee under the settlement which has been approved --

THE COURT: To prosecute the plan.

MR. STEINBERG: -- to proffer a plan which will have the elements about selling the property and provide for the fifty-fifty recoveries -- fifty-fifty sharing in other recoveries. That's embedded in the plan. The term sheet also provides that if the trustee can't consummate that plan within a certain period of time, it specifies what the recoveries -- what happens as a result of that. We can then move forward on a foreclosure and they're not going to contest it which will allow us to be able to sell the properties. And the issue about the other recoveries will be left open in the SunCal court to try to figure out.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STEINBERG: So, Your Honor, the purpose of 108 is to facilitate settlements. It's to allow this type of circumstance. It provides that they will get a benefit of the equitable share.

I will just say briefly on the second lien agent.

They asked for specific language in the order that said

notwithstanding anything in the contrary in the amended term

sheet in this order, nothing in the amended term sheet is

intended to affect the rights of any -- of any person including

the second lien lenders. So what is it that he thinks he's

still objecting to? He got the provision that says we're not

trying to interfere by this approval order of anything relating

to the intercreditor agreement. I will also say that if you read his objection, you'll never find this argument. He doesn't talk about that there may be a potential violation of the intercreditor agreement. And reading the declaration of Robert Brusco, which is basically -- encapsulates the moving brief, that's nothing illuminating for purposes of him making this argument. Whatever was on the table with regard to other recoveries was on the table when we filed this motion and all along.

So, I think what you got here was a shuffle by a lawyer when he had nothing to say. There was nothing in his objection. He always had notice of it. There's nothing about that he's arguing about a violation of the intercreditor agreement. He couldn't articulate what it was. And he bargained for a provision that says we're not trying to affect the intercreditor agreement. Frankly, I think what he does, as I said before, there are general provisions in the intercreditor agreement which talk about what the second lien lender can do or can't do vis-a-vis the first lien lender. And I think he's probably coming fairly close once he abandoned the helpful suggestions and is now trying to make a more direct claim.

So, Your Honor, I think that's my response to the remaining responses.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Basta, I'm going to give you an

opportunity. I just have a procedural question. Mr.

2 Steinberg, you mentioned the declaration which is going to be

3 | presumably the subject of some further examination. Do you

4 | wish, in connection with affirmative case, to put your

5 declarant on the stand or do you simply want to expose him to

6 cross-examination?

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MR. STEINBERG: I think, Your Honor, expose him to cross-examination.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Basta?

MR. BASTA: I just have one point to respond to because I checked my reading skills because I read the statute again. And the statute doesn't say that if we get the benefit of a reduction that we have to -- the statute doesn't say that we have to choose between (a) and (c). The statute says, we get (a) and the statute says we get (c). They're comprehensive. It's (a), (b) and (c). It's a package. I understand we get the benefit of (a). We get the benefit of (a). Now the benefit of (a) isn't going to reduce litigation. It's going to increase litigation because we're going to be sitting here at some point in time potentially arguing over relative contribution. But that -- just because there's a reduction in the greater of the settlement amount and the equitable share of damages doesn't right out (b) and (c) which all the case law says embodies a quid pro quo arrangement. And that quid pro quo arrangement -- they haven't said anything to

suggest that the statute doesn't apply. Judge Shannon never said in AMT case that the statute doesn't apply. All Judge Shannon said is that in a fraudulent conveyance action where the only cause of action is a rescission and return, he wondered whether or not there was really contribution in that context. The complaint that the trustee has been threatening with us has all sorts of causes of action, you know, brief of fiduciary duty, the same stuff that they threw at these guys. And so, to suggest that we're not going to be in a position where this contribution principle is coming down the pike, I just don't think they made a case that to show that we're not going to be harmed by the structure of this settlement.

THE COURT: But to be clear, Mr. Basta, the reason that you're objecting to the settlement is not that the settlement fails to deliver everything that LCPI should want in a settlement.

MR. BASTA: Right.

THE COURT: But rather that the settlement carries with it what you view as the negative collateral damage potentially to your client. Is that right?

MR. BASTA: I think that we read Drexel and a RICO that says when approving a settlement, the Court should consider the impact on nonsettling defendants. And in my view -- in our view -- not my view; in our view, a settlement that ignores the impact of state law on how the contribution

Page 151 claims work, a settlement that does not follow that state law, 1 2 I don't know how that settlement can satisfy 9019. So I don't 3 think it's a situation --THE COURT: But you're one step removed from that. 4 5 Very frequently, a 9019 settlement is settling litigation --6 MR. BASTA: Right. 7 THE COURT: -- or settling potential litigation --MR. BASTA: Right. 9 THE COURT: -- which is litigation that would be pursued within the bankruptcy court that is approving the 10 11 settlement. Here, you're complaining about potential collateral damage impact to your client in California of a 12 13 litigation that hasn't been brought but it has been threatened. And it's being settled as it relates to LCPI. And your 14 15 objection is that if that litigation is never pursued, there 16 may be a negative impact to the extent that California law 17 follows 5108's provisions although we haven't been cited to and 18 I don't have a copy of the California statute that undoubtedly 19 would be the statute that Judge Smith will be looking at. So 20 we've been making an argument about New York law that probably doesn't apply --21 22 MR. BASTA: Right. THE COURT: -- in California bankruptcy court. 23 24 MR. BASTA: Your Honor --25 THE COURT: Do I have that right?

24/10 Entered 10/21/10 12:24:14 Main Document Pg 152 of 176, et al; LBI Page 152 MR. BASTA: Look, I think you have the following 1 right. 2 3 THE COURT: Did I summarize the position correctly? MR. BASTA: No. I don't believe you summarized --4 with all due respect, I just don't think you summarized the 5 6 position correctly. I think we're here to approve a 7 settlement. THE COURT: You're here to block a settlement because 9 you think it's advantageous to your client to break the play and be in the room so that you can get into a comprehensive 10 11 settlement that benefits your limited partners, isn't that right? 12 13 MR. BASTA: Yes. And it's also right that Lehman is the general partner. But I am suggesting, Your Honor, that the 14 15 settlement structure itself doesn't comply with state law. 16 Now, Your Honor can say, Mr. Basta, go take that to California. 17 THE COURT: I could say that. 18 MR. BASTA: Yes. You could stay that. And we'll go 19 to California if Your Honor says that. I don't know why I have

to go here and I have to go to California. If I have to go to California, I will. My client is, I think, entitled to take actions that it thinks will benefit -- in fact, has a duty to its limited partners to do so. And here, I don't think this is a question of there's a statute. And the statute says how it And the statute says that they can't take an interest

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Page 153 in the claim against us relating to their own conduct that 1 2 they're settling. And so we're here to bring that statute to the Court's attention and say go and structure the settlement in a manner that does not eliminate our contribution claim 4 5 against them and does not incent the lenders and LCPI who 6 bought their debt with a view to solvency to have a financial interest in -- they have a financial interest in their own 7 conduct. 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MR. BASTA: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Now are we going to pursue the Gramercy 11 12 objections? 13 MR. DURRER: We're ready, Your Honor. THE COURT: Let's call your witness. 14 15 MR. DURRER: Your Honor, we would -- Mr. Brusco's 16 here. 17 (Pause) 18 THE COURT: Please raise your right hand. 19 (Witness sworn) 20 THE COURT: Be seated, please. 21 MR. DURRER: Good afternoon again, Your Honor. Van Durrer, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, on behalf of 22 Gramercy Warehouse Funding I LLC. 23 24 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. DURRER: 25

Page 154 Good afternoon, Mr. Brusco. 1 Q. Good afternoon. 2 Are you familiar with the declaration that you -- that was 3 Q. submitted as signed by you in connection with this contested 4 5 matter? 6 Α. Yes, I am. Have you read your declaration fully? 7 Yes, I have. Α. Do you have a copy of your declaration with you? 9 Not here but --10 Α. 11 I have extra copies --Ο. -- I'm sure there's plenty of copies in the courtroom. 12 Yeah. I just --13 Q. MR. DURRER: It might be convenient, Your Honor --14 15 THE COURT: You may approach and give him a copy of 16 his declaration. MR. DURRER: Thank you, Your Honor. 17 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 18 19 MR. DURRER: Would you like an extra copy of it? 20 THE COURT: Sure. (Pause) 21 THE COURT: Thanks. 22 (Pause) 23 24 Mr. Brusco, in your -- actually, let me ask you a few 25 background questions first. Do you hold any professional

- licenses? 1
- Yes. I hold a law license.
- For which state? Q.
- New York and New Jersey. Α.
- And are you a practicing attorney? 5 Q.
- 6 Α. I am not.
- When were you admitted to the bar in New York and New 7
- Jersey, sir?
- 9 90 -- 1992. Α.
- What is your position with LAMCO? 10
- 11 I am senior vice president.
- Okay. And your declaration states that you're the person 12 Q.
- 13 primarily responsible for the direct management of SunCal
- loans. I want to ask you specifically, does that include 14
- directing and consulting with counsel for LCPI in connection 15
- 16 with the SunCal bankruptcy cases in California?
- Which SunCal bankruptcy cases? There are a number of 17
- 18 them.
- The SunCal bankruptcy cases that are the subject of this 19
- 20 settlement.
- 21 Α. Yes.
- Does it also include the SunCal cases that are not the 22
- subject of this settlement? 23
- 24 Α. Yes.
- Okay. And is it also within your responsibilities to 25

Page 156 consult and direct King & Spalding in connection with the motion that is before the Court today in these bankruptcy cases in New York? But I would add that I do that in consultation with our internal committee as well as Alvarez & Marsal who is our restructuring officer. And who are the members of the internal committee you just referred to? The --Α. MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, I'm going to let him go a little bit of background. But this has nothing to do with any of his objections and I don't believe is relevant. THE COURT: I totally agree. I'm finding this pretty far afield. And this isn't a deposition. This is the pursuit of focused questioning in support of whatever are your remaining objections. So no latitude. Go to the points. MR. DURRER: For purposes of the record, Your Honor, may I make a proffer of where I'm heading with this? THE COURT: Sure. MR. DURRER: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, as we mentioned during the earlier comments, we have concerns that the settlement is not fair and is not entered into in good faith. The process by which the witness who is in control of that process went about that process is directly relevant to

that inquiry.

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reason to stand at the podium is your strained allegation that there's something about this settlement that may result in a breach of an intercreditor agreement. You don't have a generalized fishing expedition to pursue unsubstantiated allegations of lack of good faith. And this is not going to happen this afternoon. It's 3 o'clock. I've been on the bench since 10 o'clock this morning. You're going to get an opportunity to ask focused questions only.

MR. DURRER: I appreciate that, Your Honor. May --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. DURRER: May I finish with my proffer?

THE COURT: Ask your questions.

MR. DURRER: Your Honor, respectfully --

THE COURT: Respectfully, you're on thin ice.

MR. DURRER: I understand, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You have barely standing to be here. Ask

18 | your questions.

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19 BY MR. DURRER:

Q. Mr. Brusco, how did you value the various components of the settlement? And by components of the settlement, I mean the consideration that is being offered and obtained by LCPI in connection with the settlement?

MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, I'm going to object. It goes beyond the scope of his objection. I mean, he objected on

Page 158 three grounds, two of which were addressed. We think we 1 2 addressed the third. The third was the helpful suggestion -if you look at what his objections are, valuing the components of the settlement had absolutely nothing to do with anything that he raised nor touched neither topside nor bottom. 5 6 THE COURT: Sustained. MR. DURRER: Your Honor, the relief we seek --7 THE COURT: You don't seek relief. You're objecting 8 to a settlement. 9 10 MR. DURRER: We're objecting to the settlement unless 11 it is approved on the condition that there be a fair process. That is exactly consistent with the comments I made about this 12 13 settlement not being fair and not being entered into in good faith. If I --14 THE COURT: You didn't raise an objection to the 15 16 settlement that it wasn't entered into in good faith. MR. DURRER: We didn't have Mr. Brusco's declaration 17 which refers to his internal approval. 18 THE COURT: Mr. Brusco's declaration tracks the 19 20 motion. MR. DURRER: Mr. Brusco's declaration refers to 21 22 internal approvals. And that process, we believe, ends with two people, Mr. Huesen (ph.) and Mr. Walsh. It ends with the 23

same people for both sides of this controversy --

MR. PEREZ: Well --

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MR. DURRER: for the LBREP side and for their side.						
I won't have the opportunity in California to explore that						
because when I seek to depose Mr. Brusco, when I object to the						
settlement there that was just filed yesterday, these gentlemen						
and Mr. Troop, who I don't know if he's still here for						
Cadwalader, will object and say you can't discovery because of						
the automatic stay. The relief that we the condition that						
we suggested would be appropriate for approval of the						
settlement today was to either give us the opportunity to take						
that discovery and we're happy to discuss how it be limited, or						
alternatively, pick a third party impartial, subject to Your						
Honor's jurisdiction, and we will live with it. If the person						
says the deal's good, there's no lawsuit, we will live with						
that. As to the expense issue, we're happy to have the expense						
shared by the two estates. We thought Your Honor would prefer						
to have control of that person. That I'm trying and I						
appreciate the Court's indulgence in allowing me to explain how						
this is related to the settlement not being in good faith and						
fair if we don't have that opportunity. If Your Honor enters						
the form of order that we proffered, either option, then we						
have no further objection to the settlement in this court. But						
we feel that if it goes forward with one both arms tied						
behind my back in California, that is unfair. It does affect						
my rights and it's not in good faith.						

THE COURT: Look, you're making an argument in the

- 1 middle of examining a witness. You wanted to examine the
- 2 | witness. You can ask proper questions of the witness. There's
- 3 been an objection to the question which I sustained. You can
- 4 ask proper questions. No speeches.
- 5 | MR. DURRER: I appreciate that, Your Honor.
- THE COURT: No speeches now.
- 7 MR. DURRER: Thank you, Your Honor.
- 8 BY MR. DURRER:
- 9 Q. In connection with entering into the settlement, there
- 10 were no discussions, consultations, negotiations with Gramercy
- on the LCPI side, is that correct?
- 12 A. In connection with the settlement at issue, the answer is
- 13 yes. There were no discussions with Gramercy.
- 14 Q. Or any discussions with any of the third lien lenders
- other than LCPI itself?
- 16 A. There were not.
- 17 Q. Your declaration refers to your experience and opinions.
- 18 | And your opinions -- in your opinion, would it be beneficial,
- 19 | in general, to have consensus in connection with a settlement
- 20 like this?
- 21 MR. PEREZ: Objection, Your Honor. I'm not sure that
- 22 | I understand the question. So I would object to it as being
- 23 vague.
- THE COURT: Why don't you rephrase the question?
- MR. DURRER: Thank you, Your Honor.

Q. In general, do you think it would be helpful and beneficial to have universal consensus in connection with the settlement when entering into a settlement?

MR. PEREZ: Same objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Sustained. It's not tethered to particular facts. Of course it's always best if you have universal consensus and everybody sings Kumbaya. That's not required, however.

MR. DURRER: Certainly not, Your Honor. I agree.

- Q. In connection with this settlement, would it be beneficial to have universal consensus?
- A. Well, I don't think I can say it more adequately than the judge just said it. But yes, in a perfect world, I think it's nice to have consensus by all parties. I don't think that's necessary required in this case. I think we've structured a settlement that will get us to where at least LCPI and the trustee need to get to in order to effectuate the settlement we bargained for.
- Q. In fact, wasn't it a substantial factor weighing in favor of your determination to enter into the settlement that it would avoid future litigation?

MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, I don't think that's -- I think we say that in our pleading. This is not an area that is of any contention. I don't know that this is intended to impeach the witness. The matter is just repetitive. And it

doesn't go to any issue that is contested in this matter.

THE COURT: I agree. I think it would be useful to

focus on whatever it is you want to focus on in support of your

- Q. In assessing your business judgment to approve this
- 6 settlement, did you take into account the potential for
- 7 | liability on an administrative basis for breach of the
- 8 intercreditor agreement?

remaining objection.

- 9 A. Can you repeat that?
- 10 | Q. Yes. Are you --
- MR. DURRER: I'll rephrase the question, Your Honor.
- 12 | Q. Are you familiar with the intercreditor agreement entered
- 13 | into in 2007 among the lenders in connection with the SunCal
- 14 loans that are the subject of the settlement?
- 15 A. I am familiar that an intercreditor agreement exists, yes.
- 16 Q. Okay. In considering whether to enter into this
- 17 settlement, did you consider potential exposure under that
- 18 | intercreditor agreement?
- 19 A. Yes. There were discussions with counsel.
- 20 | Q. How did you evaluate your potential exposure on the
- 21 intercreditor agreement?
- 22 MR. PEREZ: Two objections, Your Honor. First, I
- 23 mean, I think he indicated that there were discussions with
- 24 | counsel. So I would object based on attorney/client privilege.
- 25 But more fundamentally, there's nothing in his papers about a

violation of the intercreditor agreement or any such thing so it really is beyond the scope of his objection.

THE COURT: Sustained on both grounds.

MR. DURRER: Your Honor, with respect to the counsel argument, the declaration specifically states that it is based on discussions with counsel.

THE COURT: It's not a waiver. This isn't an at-issue waiver.

Q. In paragraph 25 of your declaration, you state that you believe that LCPI has valid defenses to the claims and the SunCal trustee. What are those valid defenses as you understand them?

MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, again, not -- it wasn't included in any of his pleadings. In our reply, we go to great lengths in a footnote to cite exactly what we had said in the California case indicating all of the reasons why we thought it was there. Again, I don't think that there's any issue, hasn't been raised by him. And it's not something that is in dispute in this case. Yes. They -- counsel did file -- or his predecessor counsel did file a fraudulent conveyance claim.

And the position that LCPI has taken has been consistent since November of 2008.

THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection and consider that the examination is running so far afield of any cognizable objection that this is beginning to look like a fishing

expedition. Please, if you have a valid objection to the settlement, ask questions about that that go to this man's business judgment.

MR. DURRER: I believe I inquired into the exercise of his business judgment and that calculus and how he evaluated the various components to the settlement. And I believe that Your Honor sustained an objection to that.

THE COURT: What I'm telling you is that this man is being called as a witness in connection with his declaration. You can ask him questions that fit within cross-examination of that declaration in connection with his role as a witness in support of a 9019 settlement which is being proffered by virtue of the debtors' business judgment that this is in the best interest of the LCPI estate. If you have objections to that, you can raise such objections. Or, if you have objections that this somehow prejudices your client, you can raise such objections but only to the extent that it's within the scope of the declaration, because that's his direct testimony.

MR. DURRER: Okay.

BY MR. VAN DURRER:

- Q. The settlement calls for the SunCal trustee to receive 3.5
- 22 | percent of net proceeds from the sale of the collateral, is
- 23 that correct?

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- 24 A. That is correct.
- 25 Q. How do you value that consideration to the trustee?

- A. Are you asking me how is that monetized?
- Q. What do you think it's worth?

- 3 A. Well, I can give you an example. I mean, the appraised
- 4 values of the properties was sixty-two million. Okay? I mean,
- 5 I can do the math for you if you'd like.
- 6 Q. Is it your testimony that you believe that that's worth
- 7 | sixty-two million times .035?
- 8 A. Well, it's supposed to be a net -- it's supposed to be
- 9 three and a half of net proceeds. So it would be whatever the
- 10 sale proceeds are. I think in this case you have to calculate
- 11 deductions of senior liens in order to satisfy the senior
- 12 liens, you know, broker costs, all that stuff. You net that
- 13 out and then the trustee would take home three and a half
- 14 percent of that net number.
- 15 Q. And in connection with your evaluation of the settlement,
- 16 | did you do that calculation?
- 17 A. At one point in time, yes, we did.
- 18 Q. Okay. And what was the result of that calculation?
- 19 MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, I think that calls for the
- 20 | witness do disclose what he thinks the value of the property
- 21 | is. There's three pieces of testimony in the record indicating
- 22 | value. There's the forty-one million dollar offer that was
- 23 | made that Mr. Smiley referred to. There's a forty-five million
- 24 dollar credit bid which we're doing. And then there's the
- 25 appraised value which was indicated in what was filed in the

California cases. For Mr. Brusco to talk about where he thinks it's going to end up, first of all, doesn't go to any issue in the case. It doesn't go to any issue raised by Gramercy in the case and would just divulge confidential and proprietary information as to what Lehman thinks or LCPI thinks is the value of the case.

Furthermore, Your Honor, nobody is saying -- I haven't heard anybody say you're either getting too much or you're not getting enough. This is strictly a fishing expedition.

THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. I have yet to hear a question that goes to the heart of any objection. And it really seems to be something that amounts to a deposition and I can't tell if it's being used for purposes of this bankruptcy or if it's being used for purposes of the other bankruptcy where you claim that you can't take discovery because of the impact of the automatic stay. If that's your objective here, this is really a misappropriation of the Court's time.

MR. DURRER: Well, I certainly don't want to do that, Your Honor. I have two questions, very specific questions.

BY MR. DURRER:

- Q. Have you permitted your counsel in the SunCal bankruptcy case that is the subject of this settlement to engage in any discovery where they offer documents respond to discovery?
- 25 A. By any party?

Q. By any party.

recall.

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- A. I believe the answer is yes. We've actually -- I believe
 we've actually given discovery to the SunCal trustee.
 - Q. In response to discovery requests in litigation?
- A. I'd have to defer to counsel on that. I just don't recall
 whether it was in direct response to discovery demands that
 were made or it was more in a cooperative nature. I just don't
 - Q. And why have you not engaged in conversations, discussions or negotiations with Gramercy in connection with this settlement?
- MR. PEREZ: Objection, Your Honor. Irrelevant.
- 13 THE COURT: Sustained.
 - MR. DURRER: Your Honor, that question goes directly to our allegation of bad faith.

THE COURT: Well, it may also go to whether or not Gramercy filed a motion for relief from stay with focused discovery for particular purposes either in this court or in the California court. I know from my experience that no such requests for stay relief were made here. It may be that the answer to the question is because nobody asked the questions the right way. I don't think that you are doing anything that helps your objections. And I am increasingly convinced by your questions that you're pursuing another agenda here unrelated to any objection to the settlement. And I'm not real happy about

Page 168 that. 1 MR. DURRER: Your Honor, there is no other agenda. 2 3 Candidly, we just want the opportunity to explore the settlement on its merits in the California court. We believe 4 5 we're going to be prevented from doing so. 6 THE COURT: Well, I think you'll have that opportunity 7 if you make a proper request to Judge Smith. MR. DURRER: Thank you, Your Honor. I don't have any 9 other further questions. THE COURT: Okay. Does anybody else wish to question 10 the witness? 11 MR. PEREZ: I have nothing, Your Honor. 12 13 THE COURT: You're excused, Mr. Brusco. (Witness excused) 14 15 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Is there anything more on this? MR. BASTA: Not from our end, Your Honor. 17 MR. COHEN: Your Honor, just to put the -- Fidelity's 18 19 reservation of rights that we've deferred from earlier onto the 20 record, there is -- as has been discussed, part of the settlement has the disbursement of the development account 21 22 funds. And as we articulate in our limited objection, Your Honor, the disbursement of those funds may negatively impact 23 24 the availability of coverage under Fidelity's title insurance 25 policies. We've made LCPI aware of that not just in

conjunction with this particular proceeding but in prior proceedings. And we assume that as part of the calculus in going to the business judgment to consider the settlement. And we just reserve our rights with respect to any impact that the proposed settlement has on availability of coverage under the policies. And we'll defer that issue to a later date.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COHEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, we did file -- I'm sorry -- a revised proposed form of order. I don't know whether the Court was able to see that. But I can say I have copies to hand up to the Court.

THE COURT: Why don't you hand that up? Thank you.

MR. PEREZ: In particular, Your Honor, that does include both -- I think it's on the third page. The first one is the marked -- on the third page of the order, it does have the reservation of rights and the statement that nothing herein affects -- that nothing herein is intended to affect the rights of any third person including the second lienholders and that only the parties to the term sheet's rights are affected. And secondly, Your Honor, the other major paragraph is the tolling of the statute of limitations. And then the third item was also in response to Mr. Durrer's comments about concurrent jurisdiction of both bankruptcy courts.

THE COURT: Okay. The SunCal bankruptcy cases, for

some reason, have become a major distraction on here. And that's not just in this afternoon's argument but, frankly, throughout these proceedings including a matter in an unrelated case which is already on appeal to the Second Circuit.

The settlement which is currently before the Court is actually the direct result of certain statements that I made from the bench in the context of a motion brought by the SunCal Chapter 11 trustee for relief from the automatic stay in order to pursue litigation claims against LCPI in California and to sell certain property in California while depriving LCPI of its right to credit bid.

During the course of the argument that I believe took place in July of this year with respect to that motion for relief from the stay, I noted that a term sheet had been developed many months prior to the date of that hearing which provided for, among other things, the development of a plan of reorganization with the support of LCPI that would have provided for a sale of the property under a confirmed plan of reorganization. In effect, the current term sheet builds on that prior document and with some modifications including those that have been identified by Mr. Steinberg in his remarks.

This is a result that has been long in the making.

It comes as something of a surprise to me that third parties who appear not to be directly impacted by the settlement have raised objections some creatively going into

the question of whether or not joint tortfeasor law is somehow implicated in a negative way by the settlement. I recognize, and I think I said this during my conversations with Mr. Basta, that the motivation here may be to derail the settlement so that settlement discussions can take place with more parties embraced by the settlement in a more comprehensive settlement. Moving counsel for Gramercy, when asking questions of Mr. Brusco, made a general reference to the fact that it would be more favorable if the settlement embraced more parties. And I recognize that as true. It probably would be more favorable if the settlement embraced more parties. But the settlement in the form that it has been presented is nonetheless one that LCPI, through counsel and through Mr. Brusco, has urged that the Court approve because it benefits the estate.

The creditors' committee filed papers in support of the settlement although counsel for the committee has not spoken in connection with today's contested hearing. I have reviewed the committee's papers and recognize that the committee is, in effect, a strong supporter of approval of the settlement.

I'm prepared to approve it. And I'm sure that comes as no surprise to the objectors. But I am concerned about some of the arguments that had been made in respect of the joint tortfeasor problem in particular. And I'm simply going to reserve the time for entry of the order so that I can more

fully examine the cases that have been cited both by LBREP and by LCPI on the subject of the applicability of these various cases and also the standards applicable to third parties claiming potential damage on account of a settlement.

I don't see a clear connection between this settlement and the damage alleged by LBREP, but I want to give it some more thought. It also occurs to me that the proper form for raising many of these issues is the bankruptcy court in Santa Anna, California when the settlement will be presented to Judge Smith and when there will also be a plan process that will allow parties who can legitimately demonstrate that they are adversely affected by this to have their day in court. So I'm going to give this some more thought. But the clear indication that you should take away from this is that the objections are going to be, in all likelihood, overruled, that the settlement, in all likelihood, be approved and that I'll take appropriate action in connection with the proposed form of order as promptly as I can do that.

To the extent that any party may wish to submit anything in addition to what has already been presented today in the form of a letter brief, my suggestion is that that be done by no later than September 27 which is next Monday. I'm not encouraging that that be done. I'm simply noting that if you feel that there is something more than needs to be brought to my attention while I'm thinking about this that that will be

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      your last and best opportunity to do that.
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                We're adjourned.
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            (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 3:25 p.m.)
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18	Commercial Paper Inc., Alfred H. Siegel,		
19	as Chapter 11 Trustee for the SunCal		
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21	Unsecured Creditors in the SunCal		
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Page 176 1 2 C E R T I F I C A T I O N3 4 I, Clara Rubin, certify that the foregoing transcript is a true 5 and accurate record of the proceedings. 6 7 Clara Rubin AAERT Certified Electronic Transcriber (CET**D-491) 9 Also transcribed by: Sharona Shapiro (CET**D-492) 10 11 12 Veritext 200 Old Country Road 13 14 Suite 580 Mineola, NY 11501 15 16 17 Date: September 24, 2010 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25